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Consociationalism and segmented cleavages. The case of Lebanon is about the political 
development of Lebanon. It is intended to be an exploration, as objective as possible, to the 
development of major cleavages of Lebanese society related to Lebanese consociationalism. The 
science of experience has been useful as a basis of this thesis, thus the thesis is based on a 
theoretical framework, exploring Lebanese society from a consociational and a consensus  
integrative, cross-cutting theory.  
 
The turbulence of Lebanese society the last century and a half questions the stabilizing effects of 
the consociational institutions which Lebanon are based on. Lebanese consociationalism is in this 
work claimed to be based on wrong assumptions to which cleavages that divide the Lebanese 
society. The political system has been claimed to be disproportional, and to favour the 
domination of one community over others and it is accused of not including major social and 
secular forces into politics.  
 
This thesis is dedicated to find what makes Lebanese consociationalism fail in mirroring and 
represent all major groups of society; which groups the Lebanese society consists of and which 
political, cultural or religious cleavages thats divides them. Finally it explores some alternative 
institutional solutions, inspired by the consensus model of democracy, which may better 




















































This Thesis is motivated by my own experience; from the perspective of a UN soldier in 1996 
and on fieldwork in February 2007. I experienced the diversity of the Lebanon Mountains, Beirut 
and South Lebanon, and I experienced Lebanon in periods of reconstruction. Both the civil war of 
1975-1990 and the 2006 Lebanese  Israeli war made a serious impact on civil society. The 2006 
war was followed by a political crisis  a polarization between the anti-Syrian government and 
the pro-Syrian opposition. No president was elected, creating a serious power vacuum. Thus, as I 
write this preface an agreement between the oppositional parties and the government is made, 
electing Lebanese Armed Forces general Michel Suleiman as president and changing the 
electoral law, further cementing sectarianism by dividing 40 cabinet positions on basis of 
religious preference, and giving the Hizbullah-led opposition veto ability in the new unity 
government. The agreement marks the end to an 18 months conflict between oppositional and 
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The topic of this thesis considers social and cultural diversity within a state and how diversity is 
reflected through the representative institutions. Focus is on a small and heterogeneous Middle 
East country. The region of the Middle East has seen the coming and going of empires and rulers, 
shaping the administrative and political institution of the region. Movement of people groups has 
shaped the regions demography. Richard Hrair Dekmejian describes in his article, 
Consociational Democracy in Crisis, the region with these words: While the outside world tends 
to view the Middle East in terms of its national components, the region remains a mosaic of sub 
national collectivises (1978: 251). Lebanon is one of the countries that Dekmejian has in mind, 
and Lebanon is the case of this thesis. Lebanon is known for its turbulent past, of civil wars and 
domestic instability. The country has been trapped in the middle, both geographical, political 
and religiously in the power politics of neighbouring and western countries through centuries.1  
 
What makes Lebanon interesting in light of pluralist state theory, explored here, is its 
demographics and its institutional differences from other countries, with its complex politico-
sectarian milieu and its democratic traditions. In contrast to other Middle East countries, Lebanon 
has a large proportion of Christian and Shiite Muslims compared to other Middle East countries, 
which usually has a majority of Sunni Muslims.2 The complex politico-sectarian society is made 
up of many different religious communities struggling for positions and power. This more or less 
 
1 The Palestinian-Israel conflict is often referred to as the basis of other regional conflicts: the Israel-Egypt, Israel-
Jordan, the Lebanese civil war and the latest Israel-Lebanon war. The Cold war alignments have certainly 
contributed to instability in the Middle East as in most other regions. The more resent US versus Syria and Iran 
conflict, concerns mid east hegemony;  which world or culture are going to have the monopoly of interference in 
the mid East development the next century  Islamism, or Western liberalism? 
2 Most Middle East countries have a majority of Sunni Muslims; only Iran has a majority of Shiites, and Shiites are 
the largest Muslim group in Lebanon (see the demography of the Middle East in CIA Fact book: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/). Syria and Lebanon has a large amount of Christians and different Christian groups 
(ibid). 




constructed3 sectarian milieu has led to reforms favouring confessional based political and 
representative institutional solutions. In a developing Lebanese society there are some dilemmas 
that appear when establishing modern democratic institutions and at the same time balancing it to 
complex power structures between traditional sectarian communities and elites. Through time 
one group has always been dominating other groups, and reforms which intentions was to 
distribute power between the communities, has usually been in favour of one or a few groups (see 
Crighton 1991: 130-133 and Salibi 1965). Institutional reforms seem to have contributed to 
further cement confessional-community as the bases of power distribution. The 
institutionalization of sectarianism in Lebanon is in contrast to modernization processes and 
urbanization Lebanon has experienced the last century and a half (see Iskandar 2006, Farah 2000 
and Makdisi 2000).  The tradition of distributing parliamentary and government positions based 
on religious orientation is called confessionalism, a form of consociational democracy.  
      
There have been tendencies towards a reinforcement of some cleavages and an increased 
polarization between groups in the Lebanese society through time (see Dekmejian 1978). The 
intensity of cleavages can be linked to the confessional based political system. Though other 
factors like extern actors and major conflict have an effect on the evolution of major cleavages in 
society, the focus of this thesis is the duality or mutual influence between the confessional based 
political system in Lebanon related to the major domestic social, political and religious cleavages. 
 
1.2 The Problem and Research Questions   
I am curious about what may be the best political institutional solutions to deeply divided 
societies like Lebanon, how the Lebanese society is divided and how this diversity is reflected 
through the political system. I am exploring segmented cleavages and the consociational 
democracy of Lebanon in order to find out how the consociational system has succeeded or failed 
in including and representing all major segments of Lebanese society, and eventually evaluate if 
 
3 As explained later, Lebanese sectarianism may be conceptualized as a modern knowledge and a modern 
construction.  




Lebanese consociationalism of modern Lebanon is in need of constitutional and electoral reform.4  
From this interest I have constructed two research questions: 
 
How does the consociational political system of Lebanon, through its representative institutions, 
reflect the major diversities of the Modern Lebanese society? And which alternative institutions 
may contribute to more fair (proportional) representation on behalf of the segments of the 
Lebanese society?   
 
To answer the questions above I have made three secondary questions which specifies what I am 
exploring:  
1) How is the Lebanese society divided?  
2) Is there to be found a trend towards institutionalization and a cementation of sectarianism in 
government, and how does this affect representation of Lebanese diversity?  
3) Can elements of the alternative consensus model of democracy contribute to political stability?  
 
1.3 Theories Used 
The main theoretical perspectives used in this thesis is Arend Lijphart characteristics of 
consociational democracy in democracy in plural societies (1977), Lijpharts consensus model of 
democracy in Patterns of Democracy (1999), and Robert Dahl on pluralist democracy (1982), all 
of which has contributed to the exploration on how to manage more or less serious or deep 
diversity within a country. All of the models are based mainly on western countries in their 
examples.5 As secondary theory and perspectives on political development and stability I use 
Samuel Huntington (1996, 1968) and perspectives from various Arab writers.   
 
Social and political differences within plural societies are held responsible for instability and 
breakdown of democracies (Lijphart 1977: 1). Lijphart considers consociational democracy as an 
institutional solution suited to heterogenic or plural societies. Arendt Lijphart explores lines of 
 
4 The term consocio (Italian) means partner or associate. Democracy in its pluralist version is polyarchy (see 
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition Robert A. Dahl 1971). Democracy will have different meanings based on 
different perspectives of institutional solutions to diversity: majoritarian versus consensus democracy and integrative 
versus consociationalist power sharing solutions (see Sisk 1996, Horowitz 1985 and Lijphart 1999).      
5 Small European countries like Belgium and the Netherlands.  




diversity in heterogeneous, pluralist countries. Social cleavages are moderated if they are 
crosscutting, but they generate conflict if they are mutually reinforcing. In the case of deeply 
divided plural societies major cleavages are mutually reinforcing, also called segmented 
cleavages. Elites may work as possible moderators in the case of deeply divided societies 
(Lijphart 1968).   
 
I use the consociate democracy model of Arendt Lijphart (1977) to examine the status of the 
confessional based system of Lebanon, the role of grand coalitions, elites, mutual vetoes, 
proportionality and the degree of segmental autonomy related to representative institutions. 
Lijphart (1981) examine the difference between pluralist and segmented society. As supplement 
to Lijphart on the diverse society, Dahl (1971, 1982) and Huntington (1996) contribute with their 
perspectives and characteristics of what makes a society deeply divided and what may be 
institutional and representative solutions to deeply divided societies.  
 
I want to se if newly mobilized groups can be incorporated into politics in a peaceful manner. 
Here I use Huntingtons (1968) view on the relation between the development of political 
institutions and the mobilizing of new forces into politics. Samuel P. Huntington writes that: 
political order depends in part on the relation between the development of political institutions 
(consociationalism) and the mobilization of new forces (political movement) into politics 
(Huntington 1968 p. vii). If newly mobilized groups has difficulties being incorporated into 
politics this movement may become more radical or extremist.   
 
Through these theories and the literature mentioned above I want to shed light on Lijpharts main 
characteristics of the consociational society; grand coalitions, mutual veto, segmental autonomy, 
proportionality, and how the status of these ideal characteristics are mirrored in the Lebanese 
consociational system, giving a clue to how well the political system of Lebanon handle religious 
and political diversity. Ussama Makdisi (1966) argues that the sectarian diversity of Lebanon 
may be less deep or serious than other cleavages. Though I do, in some extent, agree to this 
assumption, I want to show how the sectarian diversity has been given a significant role through 
the confessional based distribution of power and government seats through time.  




1.4 Methodological Choices 
 
1.4.1 Structure 
The challenge of this thesis is to give a satisfactory description of the complex diversities of 
Lebanon. Whats found to be the major cleavages, mutually reinforcing cleavages and segments 
of society is then related to the theoretical conditions and characteristics, concerning power 
distribution, of the consociational democracy; the multi confessional elite into grand coalitions, 
mutual veto, segmental autonomy and proportional representation. Election results are used to 
see how the distribution of government and administrative seats reflect the demography of 
Lebanon. In this way I find weaknesses in the political system, like disproportional representation 
of important groups and segments of society. This is the first of my main goals.  
 
The second main goal is to explore how Lebanese diversity can be reflected more satisfactorily 
through the formulation and eventually implementation of a new electoral law and other 
institutions which make changes that contribute to proportionality in representation and mirrors 
what seem to be the major cleavages and segments of modern Lebanon. Lijpharts (1999) 
consensus model of democracy is the inspiration.   
 
The consociate model of Lijphart (1977) is illustrating an ideal situation. We may see that other 
perspectives like the consensus model are more useful to handle diversity in the case of modern 
Lebanon. When exploring how and why major lines of diversity of Lebanon have changed the 
last century I use the mobilization of different political parties and demographical changes as the 
main example. Political parties are given a special role through this thesis, eventually it is given 
the role as important institutions in the abolishment of sectarianism, opening for mass politics and 
representation on the basis of political preferences.  
 
1.4.2 Collecting Data and Working with Data 
Besides collecting data as statistics on elections and political parties I have made my own 
impressions through my travels in Lebanon. Through interviews of members of the different 




religious communities and political analysts of AUB (American University of Beirut) I have 
made my own picture of Lebanese diversity. These qualitative impressions are a useful 
experience which helps in the interpretation of quantitative election data. The main qualitative 
data analysed in this thesis is demographical and election result data. Some mathematical 
formulas are used to illustrate group and party fragmentation and the number of main political 
movements6. Mathematics is also used to make an index of the degree of cross-cutting between 
the major cleavages  the sectarian-communal axis and the party-system axis. Other interesting 
numbers is the degree of volatility and cross organizational memberships of the population. Most 
of this data will be based on estimates and not on exact numbers because it is not possible to 
know the precise preferences of individuals7. Peoples religious preferences are not mentioned in 
Lebanese statistics because it is a sensitive issue. Help in the analysis of the 2005 election is to be 
found in EUs and Canadas final report on their observation mission to Lebanon in 2005.    
 
1.4.3 Research Tradition 
This thesis has elements of both historical sociological, political development theory and the 
political institutional research tradition.8 The study of segmental cleavages is supported by the 
analysis of statistical data. Other relevant data is found in government and party documents. On 




6  Effective number of parties in a party system is explored by Murkuu Laakso and Rein Taagepera in Effective 
Number of Parties: a Measure with Application to Western Europe published in 1979. They have developed a 
mathematical formula  ENP (effective number of parties) = 1/Σ (si) 2. The fractionalization index was first 
developed by Douglas Rae (1967) and is calculated by the formula: F = 1  Σ (si) 2.  
7 The volatility expresses the proportions of voters that shift their political preferences between elections. Estimates 
are substitutes. In the case of Lebanese demography, no census is made after 1932. One of the closest estimates to 
knowing the proportion of each segment and groups of the country at large, is through the election results  what is 
the proportion of each group participated in the election? Electoral participation of each group = Estimate ≈ group 
size in population at large.   
8 Political developmental theory is born in an age of development optimism. The paths towards democracy were 
through nation building, modernization and the decline of primordial loyalties. Huntington and Lijphart were two 
theoreticians which opposed to these evolutionary perspectives on development and looked for other paths towards 
stable democracy (see Hagopian 2000: 893-894, Huntington 1968 and Lijphart 1977: 21-24). The study of 
institutions is central to political development theory (Hagopian 2000: 893).   




Some of the most influential researchers in the field of historical sociology and political 
development are Comparativists, like Arendt Lijphart who compare up to 36 countries at once 
(see Lijphart 1999). This is done both to find similarities and to find differences. My thesis, on 
the other hand, is an in dept analyses focusing on the diversity and political system of Lebanon 
and searches for some trends in its political development. But I am using consociational theory 
that is inspired by the study and comparison of small western European consociational 
democracies. I see Lebanese consociational democracy as quite different from that of Belgium 
and the Netherlands and other western European countries and have chosen not to give this thesis 
a comparative design. Thus, I use the comparative method in my analysis, in the sense that I 
relate or compare cleavages to each other.  
 
From the perspectives of Macro oriented political sociology I found literature on evolutionary 
theory, cultural and political development theory from a cross-cultural perspective. But my thesis 
is also inspired by micro and western oriented sociology through Stein Rokkan (1989) and 
Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) with their focus on main revolutions to understand the 
development of major cleavages of society.9 Publications on the divided societies (Lijphart 1977, 
1999, Dahl ) is a necessary supplement to understand why a national revolution may never 
appear and how group specific representative solutions may become an answer to societal 
heterogeneity.10 Researchers has become highly specialised in their work on specific regions (see 
Hagopian 2000). This makes comparison between regions more difficult. Comparison is kept 
between countries in the same region; Arab countries are compared with other Arab countries and 
Latin American countries are compared with other Latin American countries and so on. Micro 
political sociology bases their research on statistics and is western oriented. The literature of 
sociological macro tradition explores countries outside the western world. The Arab world has 
had a different development than that of the western world, some researches argue (see 
Huntington 1999). The Arab world consists of a civilization different in culture, languages and 
religions from that of the western world11. Another reason for treating the Arab world as another 
 
9 The research tradition on cleavages and revolutions, see Stein Rokkan (1987) on development through revolutions 
and Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) on economic development.  
10 The national revolution described by Rokkan (1987): a period or point in time where the people of a country 
developing a feeling of common identity.    
11 The people of the world can be divided into civilisations, a broad definition of culture. This is explained by Samuel 
P. Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations (1999).  




region and as a different field of research has to do with research methodology. Complete and 
correct Statistical data from Arab countries is not always available. In the case of Lebanon we are 
somewhat fortunate. Results from the last parliamentary elections and statistics on voter 
behaviour and also government documents are available. I will compare election data from the 
last elections, searching for interesting changes or trends in the material.     
 
1.4.4 Considerations 
Measuring diversity; economic, sectarian or other cultural characteristics which separate people, 
is challenging. In the case of Lebanon I make generalizations based on different kinds of data to 
find the major lines of diversity and the main segments I believe divide the people of this 
country.12 A lot of trustworthy qualitative and quantitative data is to be found on Lebanese 
diversity. But it is easy to make the wrong conclusions from statistics and literature. The goal is 
to find trends in the development supported by different sources, both from literature and through 
statistics.  
 
There are considerations using Lijpharts consociational democracy model and perspectives on 
segmentation as the ideal types or models to compare the Lebanese society. Lijpharts consensus 
democracy is considered as an alternative. Some concepts may be unclear and have more than 
one meaning. The most important concepts such as consociationalism, democracy, pluralism, 
segmentation and sectarianism will be defined 
    
The validity of data and relation between concepts are considered.13 Through the analyses of 
chapter 4 and 5 I explain why some concepts and events may be related. The reliability of data is 
considered in every measurement. To secure that my data is reliable I use trustworthy sources 
 
12 Karl R. Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002) [1935] explains that the only way of make shore of 
finding truth is through the empirical science  the science of experience.  To make generalizations from data you 
have to make shore that your statements are in the form of basic statements  statements that can be falsified. 
13 The evidence or data used to support a statement is valid if it is sufficient, representative and reported accurately 
from an authoritative source (see Booth 2003).  




like professional statistical bureaus.14 When doing own measures reliability is best preserved by 




The first chapter has contributed with an introduction to the topic and questions explored in this 
thesis; Consociationalism and segmented cleavages: The case of Lebanon. In chapter two Arend 
Lijpharts (1977) model of the pluralist society and the consociational democracy and Lijpharts 
consensus democracy is described. The development of sectarianism, political movements and 
the confessional based political system is described in chapter three (background). In chapter four 
the evolution of political mobilizations and the segmentation of society are illustrated. The fifth 
chapter (analysis) evaluate Lebanon as a consociational state and I give a general perspective on 
the Lebanese political system. Chapter six analyse some contradiction between modern society 
and liberal democracy on the one side and pluralist, segmented society and confessionalism on 
the other. Here I put the theories of Lijphart up against each other. The last chapter connects all 
of my chapters. Some concluding remarks are made, thus, the major conclusions are made 
through the analysis.      
 
 
14 Reliability is secured by using the right method and doing the calculations and measurements the correct way.  
15 Karl R. Popper in his theory of scientific work represented through The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002) 
[1935] some ideal norms or rules (methodology) are established, to make sure science and its conclusions is made as 
precise and correct as possible. One important norm is that scientific statements must be possible to test and criticize. 
This is the norm of inter-subjectively testability (2002:34). The method of empirical research may be interpreted as 
experience (2002:30). Through experience statements or hypothesis are falsified and replaced by alternative or better 
hypothesis.   





























2 Societal Diversity and Consociated Democracy 
I will describe some theories and concepts concerning the stability of divided societies. Concepts 
and terms important in making the research questions meaningful are being explored and defined. 
The analytical framework of this thesis can be taught of going along three dimensions. One 
dimension follows the history and development of sectarianism, the constitutional and 
demographical changes of Lebanon. The thesis is organized round Lijpharts (1977) four main 
characteristics of consociational democracy. And a third dimension considers the relations 
between Lijpharts consociational democracy model versus alternative institutional solutions 
represented through the consensus model of democracy. The historic background is presented in 
the next chapter. In the two first section of this chapter, below, I introduce some general concepts 
on diversity  segmentation and pluralism. In the next two sections I introduce the consociated 
democracy model and the consensus model of Arend Lijphart which I in the analysis relate to the 
major cleavages and diversity of the Lebanese society. Other main concepts and theories 
necessary to building the framework of this thesis is represented in the last sections.  
 
The main reason for choosing the models and theories of Lijphart, Dahl, and Huntington is their 
common focus. They have all their focus on political development and diversity or pluralism 
within states. Lijpharts model of consociational democracy is used to help describe the political 
institutional, representative solutions of the divided society of present Lebanon; the consensus 
model, that seem to apply to a wider range of plural and semi-plural states, help in the 
interpretation of alternative institutional solution to diversity that is up to date to the 
developments and trends in the political and social milieu of Lebanon. Huntington explores 
diversity by introducing the factor of civilizations as a measurement of cultural diversity between 
people and groups.   
 
2.1 The Segmented Society  
A plural society is a society divided by segmental cleavages (Eckstein 1966: 34 and Lijphart 
1977: 4). In this thesis I am going to relate the term segments to groups of society bounded by 
these segmented cleavages.  





2.1.1 Plural Societies and Segmented Cleavages 
A country is pluralist if there is a plurality of relatively autonomous subsystems or segments 
within the domain of the state (Dahl 1982:5). In all democratic countries, and some quasi 
democratic countries, organizations or subsystems are relatively independent and make these 
countries pluralistic. A country can be described as more or less pluralist or divided.   
 
In the case of Lebanon I am going to use the term segmented society to describe a deeply divided 
society containing segments or different communities. Main cleavages are mutually reinforcing 
between these communities rather than cross-cutting. In less divided societies difference is 
usually based on political interests and ideology. Political interests of a person or group can 
easily be shifting, but in the deeply divided, pluralist society, difference is not only based on 
political preferences and ideology but on cultural, religious and ethnic characteristics of the 
people; characteristics of a person or group which are not expected to be shifting, at least not in 
the short run. 
 
2.1.2 Cleavages and Cross-cutting versus mutual reinforcing lines of diversity  
Rae and Taylor in the Analysis of Political Cleavages (1970:1) explain that cleavages are the 
criteria which divide the members of a community or sub community into groups. The relevant 
cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at 
specific times and places. Cleavages are on different levels of measurement; the ascreptive, 
attitudinal and behavioural. The ascriptive measures the degree of heterogeneity, attitudinal 
measures degree of dissensus and the behavioural measures degree of fractionalization in the 
population. In my analysis the attitude and the ascreptive level is most central, describing groups 
difference in ideology and opinion (attitude) and relation to specific religious communities 
(ascriptive).  
 
The degree of cross-cutting is related to the seriousness or dept of societal diversity. When 
cleavages are mutually reinforcing we say that there is a positive relation between cleavages. Rae 
and Taylor define cross-cutting as, to what extent two cleavages divide a community along 
different axes (1970: 4). Fractionalization and cross-cutting are used to measure diversity in this 




analysis. The Fractionalization index of Douglas Rae (1967) and the NEP (number of effective 
parties) of M. Laakso and R. Taagepera (1979) and are used to illustrate diversity or 
fragmentation of groups along one cleavage. Religion, ethnicity and race, are more significant 
cleavages as basis for political identity and collective action today, than the class cleavage (see 
Hagopian 2000: 905 and Huntington 1996).   
 
2.1.3 Sectarianism  
Sectarian diversity is of special interest in this thesis. Sects are religious groups and sectarianism 
refers to a culture of seeing the sect and sectarian-communities in a multi sectarian society as an 
important factor of group-identification and through the sharing of positions and power (see 
Akarli 1993). There are different perspectives to how sectarianism came to be an important 
characteristic of the Lebanese society. In the background chapter (3) I will describe some mayor 
event through Lebanese history that may share some light on the phenomena and evolution of 
Lebanese sectarianism.  
 
2.2 Consociationalism  
Arend Lijpharts Consociational democracy theory is presented through challenges to pluralist 
societies of 1977. Consociationalism may be seen as a product of institutional engineering to 
secure the representation and inclusion of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within a 
heterogenic society16. This is done by sharing political power and government positions between 
the major groups of society. The form of consociationalism in Lebanon can be described as 
confessionalism, a type of consociationalism based on the distribution of political influence and 
power between groups on confessional or religious grounds.     
 
Consociationalism is distinct from pluralism in that it is meant to apply to societies in which few 
memberships cut-across ethnic or religious cleavages while plural societies rely on individuals 
holding multiple memberships, memberships that do cut across societal cleavages (see Eisenberg 
 
16 Lijpharts consociational model was created as a response to political development theory of the present (1960-
70s). Lijphart meant that present development theory had exaggerated the degree of homogeneity in western 
countries (see Lijphart 1977: 21).  




2002:8). Overlapping memberships are a component that is absent from the segmented societies 
on which Lijphart focuses. The evaluation of cleavages of society being mutually reinforcing or 
cross-cutting cleavages is of importance in considering a society to be divided in such an extent 
that it deserves the title segmented or deeply divided.   
 
 If a society is completely pluralist, four criteria have to be fulfilled Arend Lijphart (1981) 
explains. If a society is completely pluralist (segmented) it must be possible to identify the 
segments in which the society is divided. Second, it must be possible to measure the size of each 
segment. Third, there is a perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the 
boundaries between the political, social, and economic organizations. Political parties are covered 
by these last criteria. And Last, in completely plural societies, party and segmental loyalties 
coincide, which result in little or no change in voting support of the parties, from election to 
election.  These criterias are important in evaluating how successful my explanation of Lebanese 
diversity is (chapter 4).  
 
Lijphart (1977) give four characteristics of a typical consociate state. First we find a grand 
coalition in government which consist of the major elites of each pillar or segment. They come 
together to cooperate because they recognise the dangers of non-cooperation. Much responsibility 
lay on the segmental elites to stabilize the relationship between segments. Secondly, there exists 
consensus among the groups to confirm the majority rule. There exists a mutual veto between 
groups. Thirdly, each pillar in society has an equal share or proportionally amount of the 
positions in government, civil cervices and other national and civil segments in society, based on 
the pillars proportion of the total population (proportional representation). The last characteristic 
concern communal-segmental autonomy and cultural specific group right. Autonomy gives room 
for the different communities to uphold their own local school, mosques, churches, courts, laws 
and practices. All of these four characteristics are important in keeping this society stable and 
manage conflict (Eisenberg 2002:8). Thus, Lijphart identifies the grand coalition of segmental 
elites and segmental autonomy and even segmental isolation as the most important to make 
consociationalism work (Lijphart 1971:10).   
 




Segmental autonomy or limited forms of self-government provides each minority with the 
security it needs to ensure that its distinctive interests are protected and minimizes the degree to 
which it must coordinate, compromise and negotiate with other minorities (Eisenberg 2002:8). 
Lijphart argue that, good fences make good neighbours (1971:11). A grand coalition amongst 
minority elites facilitates elite cooperation and collaboration. The coalition can take a variety of 
institutional forms including, a coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems, or a distribution of 
different offices amongst elites of each minority, or equitable representation on councils and 
advisory boards that support government. Consociationalism incorporates (group specific 
representational) proportionality as a principle of political representation. The mutual veto acts as 
the ultimate weapon of the minority in order to protect its fundamental interests.  
 
Lijphart (1977) also describe seven favourable conditions making the consociational state 
possible. Firstly, Lijphart believe that at least three or more groups should chair the political 
power. The tree or more disparate groups do all constitute minorities. There exists a Multi-axis 
balance of power. The secondly favourable condition is the existence of a multi-party system. 
One party cannot dominate the other parties, but it is necessary to build coalitions. A thirdly and 
important condition concerns the size of the country. There is more likely that the consociate 
democracy function well in a small country. This makes the elite members of society more likely 
to be familiar with each other. This is related to condition four which states that the disparate 
groups should have a common feeling of belonging to the same political environment. Lijphart 
states as a fifth condition that the close contact between the segments imposes conflict. Therefore 
the segments of society should, in some extent, be isolated from each other. Sixth, there is a 
tradition of elite accommodation. And last, the elites are firmly in control and have the support of 
followers.    
  
How is the model used? Lijpharts consociationalism has been used as a description of the 
Lebanese political system. As mentioned in the first chapter the consociated theory of Lijphart 
will help us understand the Lebanese political system and how well the institutional and 
constitutional reforms of Lebanon have responded to the politico-sectarian diversity of Lebanon.  
 




2.3 The Consensus Model of Democracy 
Arend Lijpharts consensus model (1999:31-47) is in contrast to Lijpharts majoritarian or the 
Westminster democracy model (ibid: 9-30), on the issue of how many parties (majority rule or 
grand coalitions) should constitute the government. Thus, in the case of Lebanon I use the 
consensus models characteristics as alternatives and not directly in contrast to that of the 
consociational model. The consensus model is a more general model and can correspond to many 
plural and semi-plural societies of today. Some of its characteristics may, better than the 
consociational model, apply to Lebanese political environment of today. The consensus model 
consists of ten characteristics. I have picked out the eight most relevant of these characteristics to 
the case of Lebanon.  
 
Executive power sharing in broad coalition cabinet: Like the consociational model the consensus 
model favours broad coalition cabinets to secure representation and the inclusion of all major 
parties. Executive-legislative balance of power: In contrast to majoritarian models of democracy, 
both the consociational model and the more general consensus model favour a balance of power 
between the executive and the legislative institutions in contrast to the disproportional stronger 
cabinet of majoritarian models (see Lijphart 1999: 36). Multi party system: This is a favourable 
characteristic in both models. In the consociational model parties represent specific segments of 
society. In the consensus model there seems not to be a problem if the party system cleavage 
cross cuts major cultural or religious cleavages, while in the consociational model these 
cleavages are mutually reinforcing. Proportional representation: This is a favourable 
characteristic in both models. But the consensus model can apply to politics and an electoral 
system based on votes and proportion of votes distributed between different political parties, 
while the electoral system in the consociational model is based on votes to mandates which 
belong to specific segments or groups of society. Interest group corporatism: Lijphart 
distinguishes between two types of corporatism  social and liberal corporatism (ibid 37-38). 
Labour unions are referred to as social organization that predominates in social corporatism. In 
Liberal corporatism, business associations are the strongest force. Incorporation of cross 
segmental and secular organizations into politics is in contrast to the consociational model  
segmental autonomy and isolation. Federal and decentralized government: This is a favourable 
characteristic in both models. Through federalism and decentralization local communities are 




given self government rights. Strong bicameralism: If a society has linguistic, cultural, religious 
or ethnic minorities these groups can be represented through the second chamber. Strong 
bicameralism implies that the model can apply to less pluralist societies than the consociational 
model. In The consociational model the society is highly pluralist and the legislative is already 
dived between groups as a whole through group specific representation. Bicameralism in less 
heterogeneous countries works as a special representative institution in favour of minorities. In 
the highly pluralist developing countries I assume bicameralism may contribute to a balance of 
power between traditional, sectarian forces (chamber 1), elected on basis of sectarian lines, and 
new reformist forces, secular movements (chamber 2), elected on basis of pure PR. Strong 
bicameralism can also be contrasted to the consociational models criteria of segmental autonomy 
because at least one of the chambers cross- cut memberships (segmental contact and integration) 
because it is elected in a different manner than the other chamber. Constitutional rigidity: It takes 
some form of majority approval to change the constitution. This characteristic can be related to 
the characteristic mutual veto of the consociational model; the ability of different groups to veto 
constitutional change. In the consensus countries 2/3 or ¾ majority are required to change the 
constitution. Support from all important segments of society is not necessary. So every major 
group or segment of society does not necessarily have veto power in the consensus model, but in 
the consociational model this is a criterion.      
 
The characteristics of the consensus models are relevant to that of the consociational model on 
major issues concerning stability, government and representation in the pluralist country. The 
main issues: group specific representation (consociationalism) versus pure PR (western 
European style proportional representation); candidates elected on basis of their personal 
characteristics (religion or ethnicity) or their political views; communities or electoral districts 
boundaries based on confession or political communities; Segmental autonomy and isolation, 
mutually reinforcing cleavages versus cross-cutting cleavages and cross-cutting memberships; 
representative democracy and proportionality versus disproportional representation, majority and 
domination; elite driven processes and sectarian based grand coalitions versus mass politics and 
party politics; sectarian movements versus political parties (with an ideology and a party 
program); consensus democracy versus effective opposition and majority. While the consensus 
model have consensus or integrative arguments towards diversity the consociational model 




emphasize that the groups of society has as little contact as possible, and the only contact is the 
cooperation between the segmental elites  the elite cartel. The distinctions between the models 
become useful in the discussion of the Lebanese regime of today to that of tomorrow in chapters 
five and six.   
 
2.4 Core States and Civilizational Fault Lines  
Through time grate nations, empires and the movement of people groups has shaped the 
demography, social and political environment of the Middle East. In the Clash of Civilizations of 
1996, Samuel P. Huntington explains the meaning and importance of civilizational fault lines 
within and between countries to understand deep diversities. The culture of the different groups 
of culturally divided countries can be connected to that of major civilizations; the eastern and 
orthodox, versus the western and Christian versus the Arabic and Islamic civilization. Groups are, 
besides religious diversity, oriented towards a specific civilization through its linguistics. Western 
oriented groups may have les considerations using and teaching French and English or other 
western languages than eastern oriented or Islamic groups.  
 
For some 18th century French thinkers, civilized societies were different from primitive societies 
because it was urban and literate (Huntington 1996:40). Huntington identifies civilization as the 
broadest form of cultural entity. The Orthodox civilization separates it self from the western, by 
its Byzantine parentage, distinct religion and limited exposure to reformation and 
enlightenment (ibid: 45, 46). The Islamic civilization is likewise separated from other 
civilizations by its specific culture, linguistics and religion. Language is mentioned as second to 
religion a factor distinguishing on culture from another (Ibid: 70).  
 
On a micro level fault line conflicts occur between groups from different civilizations within a 
state and between groups which are attempting to create new states within the state (a claim of 
self-government) (see Huntington 1996:208). Cultural and civilizational cleavages are more 
serious than that of political interests and ideology. Secular ideology between Marxist-Leninism 




and liberal democracy can be debated if not resolved, while cultural questions on the other hand 
usually involves a zero-sum solution17, or a yes or a no answer (Ibid: 130).  
 
Civilizations may be related to a state which match the characteristics of the civilization and have 
sufficient political and military strength to serve and protect the civilization; this state is a core 
state of that civilization (see Huntington 1996: 155-164). In modern times Sunni Saudi Arabia 
has been the closest state to have recognition as a core state of Islam (see ibid: 178). The Greek 
orthodox and the Armenians have had a close relation to Russia, and Russia still has a role as a 
core state of an Orthodox civilization (ibid: 162-164). The western civilization is related to 
Christianity and the developed countries of Europe, North America and other Anglo-Saxon 
countries.    
 
2.5 Other Relevant Theory and Terms on Diversity, and Development  
The three last sections below, introduce some perspectives on modernity and development. The 
first concept, secularization, is in contrast to sectarianism. The nest term, Modern organization, is 
in contrast to traditional elite hierarchies.  
2.5.1 Secularization 
In a Sociological term secularization is differentiation and specialization. Service and 
organizations that earlier went under church administration is being taken over by state 
bureaucracies. Religious pluralism has aided the spread of rationalising tendency and it is leading 
people away from religion Hamilton (1995) explains. In the private sphere, secularisation is 
related to an abolishment of any commitment to traditional values and practises. The people may 
becoming more acceptant to change and found their decisions and actions on a rational basis. 
Though it is clamed, that, when you accept modernization, like economic development, it is 
impossible to avoid, a radical and destructive remaking of life and society, and, often, a 
reinterpretation of the meaning of existence itself (Toynbee 1961: 73) Secularization may be 
unavoidable for a modernizing people.  
 
17 In game theory, the zero sum outcome of a game means that there is a finite zero-sum outcome. In a game of two 
players; if the one player gains the other loses equivalent to what the other wins.   




2.5.2 Traditional to Modern Organization   
Eisenstadts (1968) theory on modernisation explores the development of modern states and the 
states of the third world. The early modern society was recognised by traditional values and 
family-status hierarchies that undermined rationality and legal-rational leadership. In the modern 
society all is rationalized, even religion in driven in to the individuals rationality. The total state 
structure is fragmented into a lot of specialised institutions. As a consequence, the individual are 
able to shift between loyalties. You will get more social mobility. This makes a modern political 
party system work. The people can choose between parties and their political programs. 
Eisenstadt, like Lijphart describes why elites are important in mobilizing members of society into 
politics. His model of cultural evolution and social mobilization describes how society in earlier 
colonial states may have changed and are changing from traditional societies towards modern 
societies. 
 
Stein Rokkan emphasizes nation building as a necessary step towards building a national 
common identity and state stability (see Rokkan 1987). Samuel P. Huntington describes political 
modernization as national integration. It involves the replacement of traditional, religious, and 
ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority (Huntington 1968:34). 
Political order depends on the relation between the development of the political institutions and 
the mobilization of new forces and their inclusion into politics (ibid vii). Hench, nation building 
is an important task of reformist and leaders of developing states. Thus, Huntington writes in his 
work The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, that development towards 
stable democracy in third world counties does not rest on the abolishment of traditional values 
and primordial loyalties, but it rests on the citizens commitment to democracy (see Huntington 
1991).  
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Two 
Lijpharts consociational theory is different from that of Dahl and Huntingtons theory of 
democracy, in his defence of segmental autonomy (collective rights) and segmental isolation, 
while the other sees integration and liberal democracy (nation building and individual rights) as 
main solutions to diversity. Lijpharts consensus model seems to be more general than the 




consociational model and is useful to describe a wider range of plural and semi-plural countries. 
This different perspective comes useful in the evaluation of solutions to diversity in Lebanon in 
the analysis of this thesis. Huntingtons theory of civilizations is later analysed as an important 







































3 The Historical Background to Lebanese Diversity and the 
Political System  
I will give an introduction to the Lebanese history and describe some main events or reforms 
which I believe represent important changes to the complex sectarian-political environment of 
Lebanon. The starting point of Lebanese modern history may be located to the 1920s and the 
establishment of Greater Lebanon under French mandate, giving Lebanon the territorial boarders 
of today. To get a fuller and more qualified perspective on Lebanese sectarianism and diversity I 
have to go back a bit further. I place the starting point of this history to Lebanon Mountains under 
Ottoman influence in the mid nineteen century.       
 
3.1 1840  1920 Administrative Reform and Religious Diversity of Ottoman 
Lebanon  
In the 1500s, the Ottoman millet system gave religious groups autonomy through some form of 
external protection18, from interference in communal-religious business. But Sunnis were always 
treated as superior to the others groups. Feudalism was the dominant social structure until the 
1830s. But in the mid-19th century a wave of western inspired administrative reforms reached 
Lebanon Mountains. The traditional feudal families of the Mountain fought to maintain 
traditional privileges (Farah 2000:5). The administrative reform Tanzimat of 1839 made all 
subjects equal before the law regardless of their religion (Makdisi 2000: 3). 
 
The western missionaries coming to Lebanon Mountain in the 19th century constructed a 
discourse of Mount Lebanons tribal characteristics, by separating the people into Maronite, 
Druze, Sunni, Shiite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic or Melkite in their discourse (Makdisi 
2000: 16-17). The two main religious groups of the mountain were the Christian Maronite and 
the Muslim Druze communities. The Druze community appeared in the eleventh century and 
established themselves in the south of Mount Lebanon (Makdisi 2000: 29). The Maronites settled 
 
18 Group rights and the Millet system: Will Kymlicka (1995) explain that in the European dark middle ages, the 
Ottoman Empire offered protection to Jews and Christians which fled from Europe in fear of persecution because of 
a their wrong interpretation of the word of God. In the Ottoman Empire the different religious groups was offered 
external protection; religious freedom on a collective but not an individual level.   




in Mount Lebanon during the tenth and eleventh century following persecution by the Byzantines 
(Makdisi 2000: 29). The Melkites (Greek Catholic) and especially the Maronites has a long 
tradition of cooperation with France and the western world. During the crusades, the Maronites 
went into a formal union with the Roman Catholic Church and Maronites have always seen 
themselves as the last outpost of western and Christian civilization in the Muslim dominated 
Arab region (see Crighton 1991: 129).  
 
While the centuries went by, the two major communities of Lebanon mountain developed 
peaceful relations with each other. Thus some minor clashes between the two communities were 
common. In the 1840s tensions between Druze and Maronites increased. The conflicts between 
1840 and 1861 started as an economic revolution against the Mountains feudal system. The 
system collapsed into a communal conflict (Mackey 1989: 40). The conflict became more 
dangerous when the dimension of religious diversities was included to the already up heated 
political climate. The civil war of 1860 can also be seen as a reaction to a redefinition of new 
communal and social boundaries introduced via administrative reforms and a declining feudal 
system (Makdisi 2000). The cumulative impact of the Egyptian invasion of Syria, the fall of the 
Shiabs (ruler family of Lebanon Mountain), the introduction of the Tanzimat, and the 
intervention of the Europeans contributed to the climate that opened Mount Lebanon to the 
possibilities of a new political order, based on religious differentiation (Makdisi 2000: 51-66). 
Europeans together with the Ottomans reinvented Mount Lebanon in sectarian terms in 1842, 
dividing it administratively along religious lines19 (see ibid: 51-95).  
 
To some European thinkers as Mill, colonialism offered an effective method of ensuring the 
spread of the western civilization (ibid: 5). Ottoman Lebanon and most of the Middle Eastern 
region, was going through major social and cultural changes as part of this general movement of 
western inspired modernization reforms (see Salibi 1965: 120). After the civil war of 1860-61 a 
special administrative regime, the mutasarrifiyya, was established, giving the mountain more 
 
19 In 1842 the French, British, Russian, Austrian, and Prussian ambassadors to Istanbul met with the Ottoman 
foreign minister to seek an agreeable solution to the problems of the Mountain, and in so doing they set a precedent. 
In the meeting, the parties involved realized that they agreed only on the irreconcilability of the Druze and Maronite 
positions. Consequently, they decided to divide the Mountain into two qâimaqâmiyyas, or districts, one in the north 
under a Maronite district governor (qâimaqâm) and the other in the south under a Druze district governor (Akarli 
1993: 27-28) 
 




autonomy from rest of the Ottoman Empire (see Akarli 1993: 6). French aid made Maronite 
domination possible through this regime, which gave the Maronites privileges over the Druze 
community (Crighton 1991: 130).  
 
The Ottoman Empire had been declining for centuries. Finally it collapsed at the end of the First 
World War. The French gained control over Syria; which contained the area of Mount Lebanon. 
Mount Lebanon was soon separated from the rest of Syria by the French. The main argument in 
favour of this solution was the large Maronite Christian population of Mount Lebanon which 
needed some protection, surrounded by a Muslim region. Syria and Mount Lebanon consisted 
also of other Christian communities; Greek Catholic or Melkites, Greek Orthodox, Armenian 
Catholics and Armenian Orthodox. The Lebanese country was later extended to include the coast 
line and the Beeka valley Districts. This extension to the Greater Lebanon 20 meant that a Sunni 
Muslim population and Shiite Muslim area were included into the territorial state of Lebanon. 
 
3.2 1920  1943 French Mandate, Christian Domination and Demographic 
Changes 
In A house of many mansions, the history of Lebanon reconsidered Kamal Salibi writes that the 
Lebanese society enjoyed the reputation for liberalism and tolerance, being traditional rather than 
zealous or fanatical in its attitude towards religion and political ideology (Salibi 1988:1). 
 
In 1920 the country was established as a state under French mandate. Through the consociational 
system developed through the constitution of 1926 and further institutionalized through the 
national pact of 1943, Lebanon distributes power and positions proportionally through multi 
member districts. The census of 1932 concluded that there was a demographical 5 to 6 proportion 
between Muslims and Christians of the population (Mackey 1989: 12-13). The French wanted the 
presidency to go to a Christian, the premier to a Sunni and speakership to Shiite, and using the 5 
to 6 ratio in the distribution to a single house parliament and administrative positions (Mackey 
 
20 See appendix map 1 and 2 or Itamar Rabinovich (1985) The War for Lebanon, 1970  1985, Ithaca, N. Y: Cornell 
University Press, page 23.  




1989: 110-111). But during the nineteen thirties the Muslim population had grown larger than 
that of the proportion of Christians due to the Shiites higher birth rate and immigration.  
 
The Maronites mobilized into politics earlier than the Muslims and had dominated the political 
and the economic system with the help of their French allied. A western oriented business class 
pulled in foreign capital. But the institutional, politico-sectarian structure created gross 
inequalities in wealth between Lebanese and in economic development between Beirut and the 
rest (peripheral areas) (Dekmejian 1978: 259-260 and Salibi 1965). Greater Beirut and the 
mountainous areas in south and north of the city were like a prosperous city state while the Akkar 
region in the North, Jabal Amil in the south and Beeka Valley in the east, largely populated by 
Sunni and Shiite Muslims, were zones of economic stagnation (Mackey 2006: 13).  
 
3.3 1943  1963 Reformist Movements and Pan Arabism 
The National pact of 1943 divided political offices between the main religious groupings 
(Crighton 1991: 131). The president went to the Maronites, the premier to the Sunnis and the 
speaker of parliament went to the Shiite. Parliamentary seats were distributed between Christians 
and Muslims according to the 6:5 ratios. Lijphart sees this arrangement as an example of good 
elite accommodation (ibid). According to Crighton this arrangement worked because it met the 
needs of Maronites for dominance within the system. The arrangement was an assurance for the 
Maronites that feared engulfment into the overall Muslim region. Crighton explains that the 
Muslim were willing to accommodate the Maronites with predominance in order to oust the 
French. While the Maronites were willing to give up French protection if they could be assured 
dominance sufficient to protect their minority status in the region (ibid: 132). The Muslim 
sectarian elites, who agreed to the arrangement, were in conflict to the policy of newly mobilized 
Muslims (ibid). Muslim opposition fractions wanted a greater share of power. The delicate 
balance of power inhibited the development of institutions capable of broad political reform and 
representation. Dominated by only one or two groups, especially through the executive power, 
the Lebanese state lacked the autonomy important to political development (ibid).   
 




The French was by many Christians seen as the protector of the Christians of Lebanon from the 
Arab Islamist region. The British, in favour of Syrian-Lebanese independence, supported the 
Muslims and Arab nationalists and Christian patricians of the Constitutional Block (Salibi 1988: 
186). Salibi explains that Lebanese independence in 1941 was followed by a revival of party 
politics. Emile Edde mobilized his supporters into the National bloc, in favour of Lebanese 
independence (Lebanese nationalism) but under the assurance to the French to still maintain some 
connection with the French in fear of a future absorption into a pan Arab state. The idea of an 
independent Lebanon was also supported by some Muslims, seeing Lebanon as distinct from the 
rest of the Arab region (ibid: 187). This Christian  Muslim alliance is still to day known as the 
National Pact. The Muslims and Christians agreed to keep a thirty to twenty-five or six to five 
distribution of political and administrative positions before the general election summer 1943 
(ibid: 188). The Constitutional Bloc was the winner of the election, and the chamber elected 
Khuri (Maronite) as president in September. Khuri called upon chief Muslim ally Sulh to form a 
government consisting of the six major sects; the Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Greek Orthodox, 
Greek Catholics (Melkites), and Druze. A grand coalition on a confessional basis was born. No 
sect could alone determine policy. Thus, the Maronite and the Sunnis had the largest proportion 
of the positions in relation to the population at large. The problem was that the confessional 
system was probably based on a flawed census of 1932, assuming that the Christians had a 
majority of the populations and that they in all feature are going to constitute a majority21. In 
reality, its possible that the Muslim proportion of the population was larger than that of the 
Christian already in the 1930s (see Mackey 1989: 111).  
 
The political reform of the National Pact gave a new distribution of parliamentary seats. 
Dominant groups insecurity influenced the shape of the state and representative organs by 
encouraging the institutionalization of political inequality, via quotas of representation (5/6 
ratio) or even exclusionary rules. The institutionalization of dominance coexists with political 




21 According to CIA Fact Book, the Christians of todays Lebanon constitute an estimated 39 percent of the 
population (updated may 2008).  




The French was not willing to recognize Lebanese independence (Salibi 1988: 189). According 
to Salibi, Kataib (Christian Lebanese nationalist), Najjada (Muslim) and other, both Muslim and 
Christian parties forgot old feuds in a common struggle for the international society and France to 
recognize Lebanese independence. Lebanon was unified against the French and with the pressure 
from the US and Britain, France was regularly forced to recognized Lebanese independence in 
1943 (ibid: 190). Arab nationalism remained an important issue, but the government, had a 
relatively mild Arab nationalist regional policy (ibid: 192). The Khuri government was relatively 
weak because sectarian and family policies predominated. There was also a culture of political 
clientelism developed under French mandate that corrupted politics.  
 
The failure of Syria and Lebanon to represent the Arab cause in Palestine gave in 1949 heart to 
the Syrian National Party (later Syrian Social Nationalist Party, SSNP). The movement consists 
of mainly Orthodox Christians22. The government tried to suppress organizations with a 
paramilitary character like SNP, Christian Kataib (Phalange Party) and Najjada (Muslim militia). 
This forced Kataib and Najjada over to the opposition. These movements were later reconstituted 
as political parties (ibid: 193). The election of 1951 increased the representation of the opposition 
in the chamber. Part of the opposition was the Kataib, SNP, National bloc and the Druze 
Progressive Socialist Party formed in 1949. This, Chamoun-Janbalat (Christian-Druze) alliance 
pretended to support a distinct political ideology (communism) and called their alliance the 
Socialist Front. Though, their only real common interest was their opposition to the sitting 
government (ibid: 194). Under severe pressure on the government Kurih had to resign and 
Chamoun was elected president 1952, (ibid). Lebanese politics was dominated by the Christians 
and the Muslim were poorly represented and mobilized in the following period. Lebanese 
Muslim leaders looked to Egypt for support (ibid: 198). Abd al Nasser of Egypt had turned to 
communist powers for support. President Chamoun saw the pro Egyptian agitation as a threat to 
Lebanese independence and the Lebanese president sought a guarantee from the US and the 
western world (ibid: 199). Before the general election the Muslims mobilized the opposition with 
support of the Druze leader Janbalat and Christian Khuri under the banner of the National Front 
(ibid: 200). But the Syrian nationalists (SNP), the National block and the Kataib party still stood 
 
22 Some Palestinians are Christian Orthodox, making a connection between the Palestinians cause and the Orthodox 
SNP. The Palestinian cause may be one reason for Lebanese Orthodox to be considered more eastern oriented than 
the Catholics, and embracing some form of Arab nationalism (Syrian nationalism).  




behind the president and approved of the governments foreign policy. Since the countrys 
opposition was not divided along strict sectarian lines, Chamoun, besides his support of 
Christians, could also count on support of a substantial number of Muslim (ibid). The new 
government was formed by President Shihab and the National Front.  
 
There is a deep rift between the Christians and the Muslims concerning Lebanon as an 
independent state. While Christians has enthusiastically supported the establishment of Greater 
Lebanon  the Lebanese republic, the Muslims rejected it (Salibi 1988: 2). Prior to the tensions of 
1958, the Christians had identified themselves in terms of Lebanese particularism and the 
Muslims with pan-Arabism and to other orientations linking Lebanon to the Greater Syria or as a 
part of the greater Arab region. Another crucial conflicting issue in the pre civil war years (pre 
1975) was the refusal or acceptance of the free right of the Palestinian revolution to operate in 
Lebanon and from Lebanon (ibid). The Lebanese people of today are still divided alongside these 
conflicting issues mentioned above.  
 
Crighton explains that efforts at political reform by Shihab and other important reformists in the 
pre civil war years, were much too little and too late to make way for a peaceful incorporation of 
outsiders: Traditional elites had chronically ignored their interests alienated outsiders from 
traditional politics and in so doing heightened the appeal of nationalist and irredentist ideologies 
and radical demands (Crighton 1991:138)23.  
 
 
3.4 1963  1975 Slide into Chaos, Uncover Underlying Diversity 
President Shihab was convinced that the political system was not going to change to the better. 
He had tried to improve social educational and administrative conditions in the poorest and 
mostly Muslim populated regions of Hermel, the Beqaa, Akkar and in the north, and equal 
opportunities to Muslims without too many results (Iskandar 2006:35). President Charles Helo 
(elected 1964) was also unsuccessful in reducing the tensions that were building up. Lebanon was 
slipping into financial crisis and there was growing frictions between Palestinians and Syrian led 
 
23 President Shihab was in the 1950s a stabilizing factor to the Lebanese society. He was a modernist with a social 
direction (Iskandar 2006: 33). He improved underdeveloped areas and worked to achieve good governance. 




fractions. This crisis led to the Cairo agreement. The agreement gave the Palestinian military 
fractions free movement and training in Lebanon, and undermined Lebanese sovereignty. The 
agreement was regularity forced upon the Christian president Helo and Christian fractions 
(opposed to the Cairo agreement) by the Sunni leaders, the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and the 
Syrians. 
 
The General of the Lebanese armed forces Emile Bustani signed with Arafat the Cairo 
agreement which contradicted Lebanons international obligations and opened the country to 
dangerous winds of change. A time bomb was set in the politico-sectarian scene (Iskandar 
2006:34).  
 
In 1975 the Christians made up an estimated 40 percent of the population, the Shiite community 
32 percent and rising, the Sunni community 22 percent and the Druze community 6 percent 
(Mackey 1989: 12). Tensions between Muslim and Christians can also be related to the electoral 




3.5 1975  1989: Civil War Years and Muslim Mobilization 
In the 1960s Lebanon went into deep financial crisis followed by growing frictions between 
Palestinian and Syrian-led Palestinians fractions. The following Cairo agreement undermined the 
Lebanese sovereignty. This led to an up heated politico-sectarian milieu that eventually became 
so unstable that it developed into a full scale war between domestic groups. The different militias 
had support from different extern actors. This economical and weapon technical support to 
different sects from foreign countries only worsened the situation (see Iskandar 2006: 35).   
 
The Muslims had success in mobilizing during the 1950s-70s under the banner of Arab 
nationalism, Islamism and in some degree socialist ideology. The Sunnis traditionally carried the 
banner of Arab nationalism. They represented a significant force supporting Nasserite policies 
until 1967, and later they advocated freedom for Palestinian fighters to attack Israel from the 




Lebanese borders. By the time Palestinian fighters were evicted from Beirut in September 1982, 
two Lebanese fractions were considered pro-Palestinian, the Sunnis and the Druze community 
(Iskandar 2006: 168). During the civil war, the Lebanese Sunnis were sponsored and supported 
by the Saudi regime, which to the Sunnis has and still represent a political core of their religion 
(see Iskandar 2006: 171 and Huntington 1996: 178). Hizbullah and Amal movement were the 
major Muslim movements in the 1980s. Hizbullah was inspired by the Islamist revolution, and 
Iran supported Shiites engaged to the establishment of an Iranian style Islamic republic (see 
Mackey 1989: 257). Both Islamist Hizbullah and sectarian Amal flourished by this Iranian 
support. The Christian community had few strong movements during the 1980s, with an 
exception of the Kataib or Phalange Party of Lebanese Christian nationalists. The rest of the 
Christian community was fragmented. The collapse of the constitutional order in the 1970s which 
had lasted since 1943 was to a large extent an effect of the increase in the Shiite population in 
relation to the Maronite proportion of the population (Huntington 1996: 259).  
 
The Christian Catholic fractions had a close relation to the western world and Israel. When 
Christian Bachir Gemayel was elected president in 1982 he promised disengagement from the 
Israelis (Iskandar 2006: 35, 48). He was supported by Sunni leader Saeb Salam. He was later 
killed by SNP, who believes in the inevitability of one nation including Syria, Jordan, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Palestine (the Greater Syria) (ibid: 48). In 1984 the society was divided between 
East (Christian) and West (Muslim) Beirut (ibid: 53). Damascus (peace) agreement of 1985 
signed by most warlords, was broken by the return of the Christian delegation by an insurgency 
(January 1986) led by Samir Geagea, the military leader of the Christian Lebanese forces of 
Lebanese nationalist (LF) (ibid).  
 
President Amine Gemayel during his time as president was not able to moderate the different 
fractions of Lebanon (ibid: 169). The society was too divided. By February 1984 the army was 
split and government was dispersed. From this date any major decision had to pass the test of 
three significant groups (The Maronites, Sunnis and the Shiites) and to secure as well Druze 
blessing by Walid Jumblatt (ibid). The country was not longer a state, and the crowning of 
divergences came about after Michel Aoun, as the designated prime minister by Gemayel in 
September 1988, waged his war first against the Syrians, and later the Christian Lebanese Forces, 




to cement his control politically and emotionally over what is termed Christian Lebanon24 (ibid: 
169-170).  
 
With help from the Saudi regime, Rafik Hariri succeeded in gathering the sufficient majority of 
parliamentarians to meet in Taef to outline a new constitution (Taef Agreement of 1989). Elias 
Hraoui was elected president only to find that the president palace was under control of General 
Michel Aoun, nominated prime minister by the departing president Amine Gemayel in September 
1988. Now Lebanon had two governments, one disputed in Baabda and one in West Beirut 
headed by Salim al-Hoss (ibid: 60). Michel Aoun was eventually driven out of Baabda in October 
1990 and Umar Karame was elected prime minister (ibid: 61) 
 
 
3.6 1989  2005, the Taef Accord and Sunni Mobilization 
The election summer of 1992, the first election since 1972 was arranged with success. The 
Lebanese resumed their usual bickering and fractional alliances (Iskandar 2006: 62).  
 
Rafik Hariri was a devoted Sunni Muslim and believed strongly that God is the true benefactor 
and that each and everybody reap what God wishes. This strong religious belief was fused to a 
political stand in support of Arab nationalism (ibid: 45). Hariri established the secular party 
Feature Movement. This movement was going to become an influential movement and its 
support among Sunnis has increased through the years. Hariri and FM have refused to constitute 
them selves as a political party until sectarianism is abolished (see The Daily Star 2006). The 
Taef agreement November 1989 marked the end of the civil war. The agreement implements 
some new electoral solutions. The seats of parliament are now divided 50/50 between Muslim 
and Christians and it further divides administrative positions proportionally between the sects 
(see 1989 Taef agreement in Le monde diplomatique). The Taef accord has further reduced the 
power of the Christian president. Summer of 1992 important Christian fractions abstained from 
 
24 The Christian Lebanon or Fortress Lebanon is a term made by Lebanese Christian nationalists and refers to the 
boarders of Lebanon Mountains before the extension to Greater Lebanon. The Mountain range has functioned as a 
home a refuge and an isolated area to the Maronites, from the grater and predominantly Muslim Arab region (see 
Salibi 1965, Farah 2000 and Akarli 2000).  




participating in the election. They felt that their role was marginalized through the Taef accord, 
and they were disappointed in the lack of progress in the promised Syrian withdrawal and the 
lack of progress abolishing religious sectarianism in government administration (Iskandar 2006: 
77). Hariri stressed that the Taef accord was made to preserve the rights of all fractions and that 
no fraction should have the ability to mobilize political power and influence to the detriment of 
the rights of other Lebanese (ibid: 78).  
 
Iskandar explains that after the civil war, emigration of young and educated Lebanese was on the 
increase and expectations of progress had dimmed to a large extent. Lebanon had a need for 
change in its political climate and leadership (ibid: 93). Hariri declared that Lebanon could not 
match the pace of development and political change of advanced countries with its antiquated and 
prejudice political system (ibid: 94). He called for reform of the electoral law, administrative 
organisations and in the selection of government employees and a modern standard of service to 
the Lebanese people (ibid: 95).                                                                                                                                   
 
By 1989, when the Taef conference was held, Hariri had gained sufficient recognition for the 
Sunni role, that the parliamentarians voted constitutional change, which transferred many of the 
previous powers of the Maronite president both to the council of ministers and, to a lesser degree, 
to the prime minister (ibid: 168). Until Taef, the ranking of the top political positions was 
considered in the following order: President  president of the chamber of deputies  and last, the 
prime minister. This tradition was inherited from Lebanons constitution, drafted in 1926. Article 
95 of this constitution stipulated that most senior political and administrative positions would be 
equitable apportioned (Iskandar 2006: 169, and Lebanese constitution of 1926). There was no 
specificity about the religious identity of each position. A Greek Orthodox had been president 
and a Sunni Muslim had been president of the chamber of deputies. The distribution of 
responsibilities by religious denominations became the practise first after Lebanese independence 
in 1943. The Taef agreement transferred political powers and duties from the Maronite president 
to the council of ministers which was and still is (Fouad Siniora) headed by a Sunni prime 
minister (Iskandar 2006: 173-174). Hariri was very close to the Saudis, who represent the 
religious and moral leadership of the Lebanese Sunni Muslims. While many Christians welcomed 




Hariris nomination, they remained wary and stood on the sidelines watching the political and 
developmental turmoil (ibid).   
 
Besides claims of marginalization of the Christian community there was also a problem of 
political forces and organizations being marginalized. Dekmejian writes, Despite powerful 
integrative and homogenizing social forces that have swept the region in modern times, 
traditional, ethnic, religious and tribal groups have persisted (Dekmejian 1978: 252). Families 
and sects have still a great influence over politics (Mackey 1989: 116) and political organizations 
have remained closely tied to religious groups (Crighton 1991: 132 and Krayem). The electoral 
systems in Lebanon have contributed to this marginalization and weakening of the political 
parties in favour of traditional sectarian elites and families (see Krayem). This tradition of 
sectarian elite accommodation has its origin in the Ottoman period and became institutionalized 
during the French mandate period (Dekmejian 1978: 253).     
 
The electoral law from 2000 was influenced by Syria. The law draws electoral district in a way 
that increases the possibility of a pro-Syrian government. Syria wanted to secure majority by the 
increase of mixed districts25. The minority anti-Syrian movements had to cooperate with pro-
Syrian parties in most districts to win parliament seats. The consequence of drawing electoral 
district boarders in this way is called Gerrymandering26. Syria withdrew from Lebanon during 
2005. Summer 2005 the anti-Syrian coalition with Hariris Future Movement as the leading party, 
won the election. This government now has the opportunity to get the electoral district redrawn 
and reducing the amount of mix districts and making Lebanese consociationalism work  
distributing positions fair and proportional.  
 
3.7 Beyond 2005  Segmented Society and Political Polarization   
After the withdrawal of Syria in 2005 the pro Syrian camp in Lebanon responded with the 
arrangement of a public demonstration, consisting of Hizbullah and Amal members and 
 
25 Mix electoral district are populated by different sectarian communities, all constitute a significant size as a 
proportion of the total population of the district.   
26 Gerrymandering: the drawing of electoral district boarders to secure support to a given political party or a 
candidate. In Lebanon Gerrymandering may have been used to favour candidates from a given community.    




supporters, on the 8 of March 2005. On March 14 2005 many Lebanese took to the streets to call 
for unity, independence and in support of the Hariri family27 and the anti-Syrian stand, later 
called the 14. March movement. These dates connote the two main political blocs  the 8. March 
opposition versus the 14 of March government after the 2005 general election.   
 
The election of 2005 proceeded without major security incidents. But as most Lebanese 
recognized, the Lebanese electoral law is distorted by the administrative classifications (Iskandar 
2006: 180): In the South, the Shiites has an overwhelming power to determine the success of 
Christian nominees. In the North and in Beirut the Sunnis have this power. The importance of the 
Shiite movements in the Shiite dominated communities made sure that their parties (Amal, 
Hizbollah) nominees would be elected. Feature Movement with its leader Saad Hariri chose to 
cooperate with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and his party Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), 
and The Qornet Shahwan grouping, a Christian group of Christian political party chiefs and 
partisans of the Lebanese Forces. Hizbollah and Amal swept the elections in the south district and 
the Beqaa. Hariri and Jumblatt prevailed in the districts of Beirut, Chouf, Baabda and Aley. 
General Michel Aoun came back from exile in France and assumed the position of decision 
maker in respect of nominees in Metn, Kesrouan and Byblos. Aoun and his Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM) benefited from sectarian voting instincts of the Christian electorate, bringing to 
parliament 21 candidates. Aoun hoped to be supported in the north administrative district, but this 
failed. This is because the north is Sunni dominated and the Sunnis responded to Saad Hariri 
(sectarian voting). The Lebanese have, in elections, a self-corrective tendency that operates to 
limit the power of any one group. This can be expected in a political society that endorses 
elections on sectarian bases, and where political representation is often linked to favouritism 
(Iskandar 2006: 180). 
 
 
27 Future Movement leader and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri were assassinated February 2005. The 
assassination gave the Hariri family a massive support by both Christian and Muslim groups. The Sunnis and most 
western oriented groups (anti-Syrian fractions) blamed Syria for the assassination and called for an immediately 
withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanese ground (invited in 1976 to stop sectarian clashes). The anti-Syrian 
fractions gathered on the streets to protest. Massive pressure from Lebanese and western countries made Syria 
withdraw its troops after 20 years (see cedar revolution).   




In 2004 President Emile Lahouds term was extended three years to 2007. No new president was 
elected in 2007 due to disagreements between the two main political blocs, on the electoral law 
(veto power to the opposition) and presidential candidates. 
 
Irrespective of the disproportional distribution between sects in some districts, the 2005 
parliamentary election may show some new trends in elections (Iskandar 2006: 181). The 
parliament of autumn 2005 had 61 new members out of 128. Traditionally few new members are 
elected, usually not more than 20 percent or between 20 and 30. Youth seems to be more 
important than before. The seventy-two deputy majority block is led by Saad Hariri only thirty-
five years of age, a traditionally low age for any influential politician. A problem is uncontested 
winners. Seventeen parliament members out of 128 were uncontested in 200528. Most 
competition was to be found in the Christian electoral districts where General Aoun challenged 
all other Christian nominees. The Hariri bloc (anti-Syrian) elected Fouad Siniora to prime 
minister (ibid: 182). The new cabinet had representatives from all major political parties except 
the Bloc of General Aoun, who claimed that his bloc is the only true representative of the 
majority of Christians (ibid: 184).  
 
In November 2007 the parliament were going to elect a new (Maronite) president. This was not 
achieved do to serious disagreements between the opposition and the government parties on the 
electoral law and the distribution of cabinet seats. Parliament has not met in more than a year and 
the government is not recognized by many of the nation's citizens (Bluhm 2008). This has led to a 
power vacuum. But for a country with a dormant legislature and without a president or 
universally recognized government, Lebanon is remarkably stable. The big players (Syria, 
Hizbullah and The Lebanese Armed Forces) are playing an important part in keeping it stable 
(Bluhm 2008). The Muslim Hizbullah, Amal and Christian FPM opposition alliance may also 
prove a stabilizing force because it cross-cuts the religious  and in some extent the sectarian 
cleavage29. 
 
28 Uncontested candidate: no other alternative candidates competed for the position. See lebanvote.com or the 
European Union Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005: Final Report on the Parliamentary Election.  
29 The Maronite community is split between the oppositional party FPM and the government coalition parties Qornet 
Shehwan Gathering (which include the Phalange Party) and Lebanese Forces. See more on this issue in chapter 4.  





3.8 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Three 
In this chapter I have described the history of Lebanese homogenity and regime development. 
The main focus of this history has been the development of the politico-sectarian diversities and 
the confessional based political system. The main question I am rising concerns the relationship 
between religious diversities in society and representative institutions. The challenge of 
representative, state institutions is to correspond to the demands of the divided society. The 
different groups and movements of the divided and segmented society want a share of political 
power. In modern Lebanon there is a fragile balance of power between the fragments (political 
movements, communities and sects) of society. Stability is contributed by representative 
proportionality between the main interest groups, movements and traditional elites. From another 
perspective, it is a balance between liberal democratic values one the one hand, and pluralist 
group specific representative institutions, on the other. These assumptions make up the 
contradictious relation of a modernizing, and in some extent secularizing Lebanese society that 
exists in a confessional political system based on traditional power structures. As I will describe 
later the Lebanese society has gone through major political and social changes in modern times 
(from the mid nineteenth century). Political activism and political interest has increased. Social 
mobility has contributed to urbanization. The decline of sectarianism in some areas in society like 
moral, liberty, consumption and secular modern organization, is in contrast to another trend 
towards increased confessional based political institution like the proposed tree way split30. 
Political assassinations, institutional instability and civil wars have been linked to the fragile 
power sharing structure of Lebanese consociationalism. The structure of Lebanese diversity is 
further explored in the next chapter. This structure is related to the consociational democracy in 
chapter five in the search of an answer to how Lebanese consociationalism has failed or 





30 Proposition represented by the Hizbullah-led opposition which intents to secure a veto power in a unity 
government.  































4 The Segmented Cleavages of Lebanon 
This chapter will introduce some demographical and election data. This data is organized in a 
manner illustrating the way Lebanese society is divided along sectarian-communal, political and 
socioeconomic axis. A fourth major line of diversity  the civilizational fault line  is of special 
interest; it tells a story about a major historical-cultural diversity between Lebanese groups. The 
sectarian and party system cleavages will be related to each other in a model illustrating their 
degree of cross-cutting. The first sections of this chapter are dedicated to the description of the 
major cleavages explored.  
 
4.1 The Major Cleavages  
I will measure the sectarian cleavage and party system cleavage by using the fractionalisation 
index of Douglas Rae (1967), and in the case of the party system cleavage also the formula of 
NEP (number of effective parties) of Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The class cleavage and the 
cultural sub-civilizational line are explored in more of a qualitative manner. This is because there 
is of special difficulty to give any quantitative and reliable sources to give a quantitative 
illustration of these cleavages. An issue important to evaluate fragmentation along cleavages is 
the degree of crystallization  defined as the proportion of a given community having a definite 
position on a given cleavage (Rae and Taylor 1970: 90). In the case of the sectarian cleavage 
almost all Lebanese has a religious preference31. In the case of the party system cleavage only 
half (64) of the members of parliament relates themselves to one of the eight largest parties.  
4.1.1 Demography and the Sectarian Cleavage    
There are 17 confessional groups in Lebanon. 98 percent of the Lebanese citizens belong to one 
of these groups. This makes the degree of crystallization on this cleavage near one or maximal. I 
am only going to explore the fractionalization on this cleavage related to the seven largest groups. 
The smallest of these groups, the Armenian Orthodox, constitutes approximately three percent of 
 
31 CIA Fact Book: 97,7 percent of the population are related to one of 17 recognised sectarian communities. A recent 
study calculated that the resident Lebanese population in 2001 was 3 935 000, 36 % of which lives in the Greater 
Beirut Region (Beirut and its suburbs) (Choghig Kasparian, La population libanaise et ses caractéristiques, Presses 
de lUniversité Saint Joseph).  
 




the population while the largest, the Shiite community, constitutes 40 percent. The size of this 
and the other five groups are estimates32. This is because no census or measure of group size has 
been made after 1932. In a sectarian system, group size is a basis of the distribution of power; 
therefore the question of group size is a highly sensitive question. Demography estimates are 
based on interviews or question schemes and voter registration, and this has shown a general 
increase of the Shiite population and a stagnation of the Christian part of the population.    
 
Cultural-historical differences between the groups may shed some light on the degree of intensity 
of the diversity between the groups. The largest Christian community, the Maronites, is an old 
sect with traditions back to 500 AD. They have been influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. 
In the 18 century catholic missionaries tried to separate the Greek Orthodox from their eastern 
roots. This was partially successful. A segment of Greek orthodox changed to Greek Catholics 
now called Melkites (Mackey 1989: 36). A similar divide is to be found among the Armenians  
into one catholic and one orthodox interpretation of Christendom. These divides bring us back to 
the separation between the Western and the Eastern Church. The Eastern Church represented by 
the Byzantine Empire and later Russia, and the Western church, represented by the Holy Roman 
Empire and later a large proportion of the western world.   
 
The major Muslim communities are the Shiites, Sunnis and the Druze. The Sunnis constitute 90 
percent of the Muslims of the world and represent the Orthodox or mainstream version of Islam. 
The Shiite community was created from a split among the Muslim on the question to whom to 
succeed the seventh imam, Ali. Shiites are seen as heretics in the Sunni community. The Druze 
community sprung out of the Shiite community. The religious practises of the Druze separate 
them from the Sunni and Shiites community and they are seen as heretics or even worse, non 
believers or atheist, among other Muslims. Almost all Lebanese can be related to one religious 
community and no Lebanese may hold multiple religious memberships.   
 
The perspective of centre- periphery perspective of political development theory states that a 
movement of people from the periphery to the centre (urban areas and the city) would mean that 
 
32 Estimation is the calculated approximation of a result which may be used even if input data may be incomplete and 
uncertain. 




the population is getting more homogeneous. In the case of Lebanon this is not the case because 
of an entrenched communal and confessional based diversity and confessional thinking. Even 
though great numbers of people of all confessional-communities have moved to or work in the 
cities and central area (Beirut), they still belong to, and have near connections to a given local 
community (see Salibi 1965). Christian sects are concentrated in Northern and Central areas and 
Muslim sects are concentrated in the South, East and peripheral areas of the country33. Although 
there are mixed districts, many districts constitute a majority of one of the major sects.     
 
Sectarian group fragmentation (Fsectarian) is based on the relative size of each sectarian community 
measured from estimates on group size. I am using the fragmentation index by the seven major 
groups and their estimated share of the population si in percentage 200534: Druze: 5,6; Sunni, 26; 
Shiite 26; Maronite, 22; Melkite (Greek Catholic), 8; Greek Orthodox, 6; and Armenian 
Orthodox, 3.   
 
The fragmentation formula: F = 1  Σ (si) 2 
 
The degree of fragmentation of the sectarian (trait cleavage and nominal) cleavage describes the 
degree of homogeneity produced by this cleavage. 0 connotes total homogeneity. A result close 
to the maximal result 1 connotes heterogeneity. The Fragmentation of the sectarian cleavage is 
connoted by Fsectarian by the seven larges sects si. Fsectarian (Estimate) = 1 - Sum si (Estimate) 2. si 
(Estimate) is defined as; registered to the parliamentary election (2005) of each religious 
community i as the proportion of the population at large:   
 
F = 1  Σ (si) 2 
 
sDruze = 0,056; sMaronite = 0,22; sShiite = 0,26; sSunni = 0,26; sMelkite = 0,08; sArm.Orth. = 0,03; sGreek Orth. 
= 0,06  
Σ (si) 2= 0,003136 + 0,0484 + 0,0676 + 0,0676 + 0,0064 + 0,0009 + 0,0036 = 0,197636 
 
33 See map appendix 2: demography and sectarian communities in Lebanon 
34 The proportions of each sect of the population are calculated using an estimate of group size found in the final 
report to the European Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005, or the Lebanese Ministry of Interior 2005 (See appendix 
table 3).  
 





Fsectarian = 1  Σ (si) 2= 1  0,197636 ≈ 0,80 
 
As expected there is a high degree of fragmentation, using the fragmentation index, which we can 
read as heterogeneity along the sectarian cleavage.  
 
If democracy is destiny, population movements are the motor of history.  
Samuel P. Huntington (1996:198) 
 
4.1.2 The Party System Cleavage  
It is difficult to place the movements on a political left-right axis because of the dominating 
sectarian identity of the movements, sectarian interests and that politics are dominated by high 
status sectarian elites. But on many issues Amal, Hizbullah, LF, Phalange Party and SSNP are all 
conservative. Hizbullahs ideology can be described as Islamic nationalist with a special 
connection to the religious revolution of Iran, while the Shiite Amal Movement has a closer 
relation to Syria. The Phalange Party and SSNP have been inspired by European fascist 
movements, and can be placed far right on the axis. But while the Maronite Phalange Party has 
represented Lebanese nationalism or Christian nationalism the SSNP has represented the idea of 
Greater Syria. Thus, in later years the SSNP have had internal struggles between right wingers 
and socialist oriented members, willing to cooperate with communist parties. I will also describe 
the FPM as conservative. They represent a large part of the Christian population, both Orthodox 
and Catholic. One segment of FPM members and supporters has a Lebanese nationalist and 
isolationalist ideology while other accepts the Lebanese boarders of today and their Arab 
heritage.  
 
In the middle of the left-right axis, the FM describes it self as a secular party and they has much 
more of a liberal policy, in an economic sense and on family values and religious freedom. But 
the movement consists of basically Sunni confessionals. This makes it strange to call it fully 
secular from a western perspective. The predominantly Druze PSP, is constituted as a socialist 
party. In reality it is not so much of a socialist party. Like all the other movements they cooperate 




with other movements despite seemingly ideological differences. The party is highly sectarian 
with predominantly Druze members and supporters.  
 
From 2005 the political system is highly polarized into two major political blocs in parliament. 
Orthodox, Catholics of the FPM (Aouns Free Patriotic Movement) and Shiites of Amal and 
Hizbullah have formed the pro-Syrian opposition (the 8. march movement). The Pro- Syrian FPM 
gained a lot of sympathy in the pro- Syrian Shiite population, though it is a Christian confessional 
based party. The FPM took the initiative for a protest against the anti- Syrian government and is 
the leading oppositional party. The government consists of western oriented anti-Syrian, mostly 
urban, middle to higher middle class Sunnis of the FM, Druze of the PSP and Uniate, Maronite 
Christians of the LF and Phalange Party, together constituting the 14th March movement. 
 
Fighting fiercely against PLO under the civil war, Amal have no tolerance towards Palestinian 
aggression. While Hizbullah traditionally have supported the Palestinian cause and searched for a 
diplomatic solution to the Fatha al Islam (Palestinian, and Palestinian supporting militia) and 
Lebanese Army clashes in 2007, Amal wanted the Lebanese Armed Forces to use every means 
necessary in fighting the insurgents, as the Amal militia did fighting PLO during the civil war. 
There still exists a difference between Shiite movements Hizbullah and Amal in the Palestinian 
question. Most Christian parties except some orthodox do not support the Palestinian cause. A 
bound exists between the segment of Orthodox Palestinians and Lebanese Armenian and Greek 
Orthodox. Both Sunni elites and Druze PSP supported the Palestinian cause in the 60s (Chapter 
3).  
 
I will conclude that there are differences and some major differences between the political parties 
but I will not try to produce any quantitative measure of the intensity of diversity. Instead I am 
going to illustrate the degree of homogeneity produced by the party-system cleavage using the 
fragmentation index. Party system fragmentation (Fpartysystem) is based on the relative size of each 
party measured from the voter turnout. I am using the fragmentation index by the eight major 
political organizations and their share of the mandates after the 2005 election. si = Proportion of 
the total number of mandates to party organization i: Druze PSP (16), Sunni FM (36), Shiite 




Amal (14) and Hizbullah (14), Maronite LF (6) and Qornet Shehwan Gathering (Phalange Party) 
(6), and Catholic, Orthodox FPM (14) and SSNP (2)35:  
 
sPSP = 0,125; sFM = 0,28125; sAmal = 0,109375; sHizbullah = 0,109375; sLF = 0,046875; sQornet Shehwan 
Gathering (Phalange Party) = 0,046875; sFPM = 0,109375; sSSNP = 0,015625 
Σ (si) 2  = 0,0156 + 0,0791 + 0,0120 + 0,0120 + 0,0022 + 0,0022 + 0,0120 + 0,0002 = 0,1353 
 
Fpartysystem = 1  Σ (si) 2 = 1 - 0,1353 ≈ 0,86 
 
ENP (Effective Number of Parties) = 1/Σ (si) 2 ≈ 7 
 
Using the measurement of Laakso and Taagepera, ENP the effective number of parties are 7. 
Both measurement of fragmentation illustrates a highly fragmented party system.  
 
4.1.3 Core States, Civilizational Fault Lines and Segmented Nationalism 
Major cultural lines of diversity and segments in society are based on what I will call sub-
civilizational lines of diversity. Civilizational lines are based on main cultural historic differences 
between groups of people, sectarian lines, as I claim, are not. I will argue that these cultural 
differences are related to different concepts of nationality and nationalism. This dimension does 
not follow the same segments as the sectarian line of diversity. As we shall see later in my 
analysis there is greater diversity between more or less religious orthodoxy and eastern or 
western orientation than between Muslim and Christian, in political cooperation and sectarian 
relations. The Traditional/Orthodox groups are the Shiite groups and Orthodox Christians, while 
the Uniate/Western oriented groups is the Uniate Christians, the Druze community and Urban 
Sunni Muslim.   
 
 
35 The data is gathered from the result of the 2005 parliamentary election (lebanvote.com/ Wikipedia.com: Lebanon 
election 2005) 
 




All Christian groups are minorities in Lebanon and in the Arab region, and they have needed 
some forms of (extern) protection. And they have found their protectors in other countries, 
mostly western countries and the western civilization where Christianity is outspread. The Greek 
Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox have a cultural orientation to the east and their Arab heritage, 
in sharp contrast to Maronite movements who refuse to accept to have any connection to an Arab 
cultural and ethnic background. Instead, the Maronites search back in time for their real 
ancestors, the Canaanites, Assyrians and the Phoenicians. In this way, they distinguish 
themselves from the Arabs and find a closer link between the Western culture and their own 
(Akarli 2000, Makdisi 2000). In the aftermaths of the crusades the Maronite Catholics of Syria 
went into a union with the Roman Catholic Church. The Orthodox remained allied with the 
Orthodox Byzantine Empire, and later, orthodox Russia. Until this day, the Orthodox have 
remained more oriented towards the Eastern Church, an eastern world and Arab tradition. The 
main member base of the Social National Syrian Party has been Orthodox. While the Maronites 
have followed the western world, the Greek orthodox have an orientation towards Greater Syria. 
Because of a closer relation to the Muslim population, Greek Orthodox have adopted Arab 
ideologies like pan Arabism while the Maronites have rejected it (Mackey 1989: 38). Mackey 
explains that Lebanese Christians are split in their perception of themselves in relation to the 
West  how they define their own Arabness. The Maronite Catholics reject any connection to an 
Arab cultural heritage. The Orthodox accepts a status as part of an Arab world and the Melkites 
(Greek Catholic) vacillate between the two attitudes. There is a natural scepticism towards Arab 
nationalism in Christian groups. They assume that Muslims understand the concept of nation in 
terms of umma  the Islamic community. This image would be in sharp contrast to the western 
notion of the nation state that most Lebanese Christians embrace (Mackey 1989: 30).  
 
Ussama Makdesi writes that: Religion became the site of the colonial encounter in the Ottoman 
Empire in that European officials defined the parameters of reform through a modernization 
discourse couched in term of a religious civilizational clash (Makdisi 2000: 6).      
 
The pre Second World War years until the civil war mark a period of conflicting nationalist 
ideologies, all with its unique view of Lebanese identity and what Lebanon is suppose to be. The 
lack of a successful national revolution and its multi ethnic mosaic makes Lebanon a multi 




national country36. Its a pluralist pot of different nationalities  Armenians, Kurds, Syrians, 
Palestinians and Lebanese split between malignant religious and communal divisions (Mackey 
1989: 11). Most Lebanese consider themselves Lebanese. But their identity lies elsewhere than 
with the territorial boundaries of modern or Greater Lebanon and to a Lebanon containing one 
united people. The family, local community and religious community are more important as a 
basis of identity. Their nationalism is connected to this communal identity and confessional 
group identity, and not to the Lebanese state as a whole. Pan Arabism, Syrian nationalism, 
Christian nationalism and Islamist all contribute with different concepts of nationalism. 
 
Pan Arabism is based on the assumption that all Arabs have a cultural and ethnic common 
heritage and that there is, or should be, a natural unity between Arabs. Sunnis had the closest 
relation to pan-Arabism of the Lebanese communities (during the 60s). Islam is sometimes 
connected to pan Arabism, but especially Shiite Muslims have actually been sceptical to the 
concept of pan Arabism. Shiites being a minority Muslim community in the Sunni dominated 
Arab region, has made Lebanese Shiites afraid of being overrun by a Sunni dominated Arabian 
region. The Shiite community in Lebanon has their loyalty and trust in the Shiite Islamist 
nationalism and revolution. The Islamist revolution in Shiite dominated Iran gave a boost for the 
Lebanese Shiite Islamic nationalism in the 80s. On the issue of nationality, Islamists in various 
Muslim communities reject the nation state in favour of the unity of Islam (see Huntington 1996: 
175). There is a tendency towards an Islamic revival the last decades. The Islamic resurgence can 
be seen as both a product and an effort to come to grips with trends of modernization (see 
Huntington 1996: 116). The Maronites are also sceptical to the idea of Arab unity and pan 
Arabism. They have there own idea of a Christian Lebanese nation. This idea has been 
represented by the Christian movements of the Phalanges Party and Lebanese Forces. 
 
 
36 Nation building and the AGIL scheme of Stein Rokkans classical work Stat, nasjon og klasse (1987:298-300): 
The national revolution; between a central nation building culture against ethnical, religious and linguistic distinct 
underprivileged people groups in the provinces and peripheral  areas, and the conflict between the centralizing, 
standardizing and mobilizing nation-state and historical corporative privileges of the church. Richard Hrair 
Dekmejian writes in his article Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon, that the successful nation 
building in Europe, (a phase of intense monolithic nationalism, even the larger Western European states have now 
entered the post-industrial "end of ideology" era), are followed by an awakening of ethnic and religious nationalist 
ideologies and a resulting tendency toward decentralization and segmented pluralism (Dekmejian 1978: 263). 




The Greek Orthodox dominated PPS later SSNP (established in 1932) advanced the concept of 
what is called Syrian Nationalism. The idea is not based on the religious solidarity of Islam but 
on the idea of Greater Syria (Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, present day Syria, Cyprus 
and a part of Turkey) as a distinct historical, cultural and geographical entity. This idea is 
different from Arab nationalism or pan Arabism because it does not embrace all Arabs, only 
those within the boarders of the Greater Syrian state (Mackey 1989: 38).  Today, only a minority 
of Orthodox are associated with Syrian nationalism. The Orthodox like the other Christian groups 
is separated between Lebanese nationalism (isolationalism) and the idea of belonging to a greater 
Arab civilization. But the Orthodox is and has always been the Christians with the strongest 
eastern and Arab orientation and has the closest relationship with Muslim groups.  
 
Both the Christian and the Sunni communities are, and have traditionally dominated the national 
political and economic affaires. These communities seek together in political and economic 
matters. Also the Druze community have a scent for politics, economics and business, though it is 
a more isolated community. In the Shiite community there has been found a rather different 
attitude towards political participation and competition and their community lies outside the 
political and economic prosperous centre of Beirut and Lebanon Mountain.   
 
The breakdown of the Ottoman Empire left Islam without a core state (Huntington 1996: 177). 
The two main Muslim groups found each their allied and core state or political centre of their 
religion. As mentioned earlier Iran can be refered to as the core state of what I call the sub-
civilizational segment of Shiite Islam, while the core state of the sub-civilizational segment of 
Sunni Islam is Saudi Arabia. This is, in my view, one of the most important contributors to 
diversity, because it is closely linked to more or less western orientation. The Sunni Muslims 
have cooperated tightly to the west and Sunni Arab countries, also with a close connection with 
the west. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a close economic connection to the west. Sunni Pan 
Arabism and especially Nasserism has indirectly contributed to a closer connection between 
Lebanese Sunnis and the Western world37. The breakdown of Pan Arabism, Nasserism and 
Communism forced the Sunni community to find other allies. Since the collapse of communism, 
 
37 Nassers Egypt and his socialist agenda created a common identity among Sunni Muslims. The regime managed to 
gain autonomy from international actors and it created domestic elite who enabled economic development and the 
redistribution policies (Hamilton 1982). Nassers state- and nation building became an ideal also among Lebanese 
Muslims (Mostly Sunni and Druze).   




pan Arab socialist states were no longer supported financially and ideologically by the Soviet 
Union (see Huntington 1996: Chapter 6). The Shiite community is another story. Supported 
financially and ideologically by Islamist Iran the Shiite went towards an Islamist traditional and 
Islamist nationalist orientation.  
 
This split between groups is related to Huntingtons definition of civilizations (see Huntington 
1996), though the main political blocs can be said to cross-cut the religious dimension Islam-
Christendom and also the sectarian cleavage to some degree. Huntington does also use linguistic 
diversity in his operationalization of diversities between civilizations (ibid: 70). In Lebanon there 
is a greater use of French and English by government supporters and western oriented 
movements and groups while the eastern oriented groups use Arabic. I have found four sub-
civilizations which are connected to sects, a nationalist idea and a political core state of the 
groups culture and religion.  
 
Shiite: Islamic nationalism: the core state of Iran  
Eastern oriented Orthodox and Catholics: Syrian nationalism: the core state of Syria 
Western oriented Maronite and Catholics: Lebanese nationalism: the core state of France (and 
perhaps Italy, US and Canada) 
Sunni and Druze: Arab nationalism: the core states of Saudi Arabia and Egypt                                             
 
4.2 Cross-Cutting Cleavages  
The major cleavages studied in this thesis are the party system, sectarian and the class cleavage. 
The quantitative measurements of political cleavages made in this chapter will shed light on 
Lebanese diversity. The degree of fragmentation of the people on the three cleavages and the 
relation between the cleavages are measured. These measurements would not be possible without 
the techniques developed by Douglas W. Rae, Michael Taylor introduced in their work The 
Analysis of Political Cleavages (1970).    




4.2.1 The Party System  Sectarian Dimension 
The political movements of Lebanon are divided along the sectarian cleavage as follows: The 
Amal Movement represents a fraction of the Shiite community; Another Shiite fraction supports 
Hizbullah; Uniate Maronite Christians support the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange Party and in 
some extent the Free Patriotic Movement; Christian Orthodox and Catholics are also represented 
by the FPM and a fraction of Christians supports the Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Sunnis 
support the Feature Movement; and at last, the Druze community are represented by the 
Progressive Socialist Party. This kind of generalization is possible because we are aware of the 
Lebanese religious-communal influenced voting and group support.  
 
I have used the party preference and religious orientation to half of the 128 mandates elected to 
the parliament of 2005. The product is the distribution of table 4.1 below. The remaining 64 
mandates are independent candidates or represent a small party or list not among the 8 main 
parties. Candidates can be elected by their community without belonging to a specific party 
because they are elected on the basis of their confessional-community relation and not a party 
program.   
 
Table 4.1 Party preference by religious preference of MPs 2005 - 2009 
                                         
 Druze Sunni Shiite Maronite Melkite Orthodox  
PSP 7 (0,11) 1 (0,0156)     8 (0,1256) 
FM   15 (0,234)  2 (0,0313)    17 (0,2653) 
Hizbullah   11 (0,1719)    11 (0,1719) 
Amal   5 (0,0781)    5 (0,0781) 
FPM    8 (0,125) 1 (0,0156)  9 (0,1406) 
Qornet     2 (0,0313) 1 (0,0156) 2 (0,0313) 5 (0,0782) 
LF    6 (0,0938)  1 (0,0156) 7 (0,1094) 
SSNP     1 (0,0156) 1 (0,0156) 2 (0,0312) 
 7 (0,11)         16 (0,2496)    18 (0,2803)    16 (0,2501)     3 (0,0468)     4 (0,0625) 64 (1,0) 
                                                                                                                                
Table 4.1 is based on the mandates religious and party preferences. See European Union Election Observation 
Mission: Parliamentary Elections Lebanon, Final Report (2005: 61-64).                      
 







Table 4.1 is based on the religious and party preferences of 64 of the elected members to the 2005 
 2009 parliaments. The result 0,1202 illustrate a low degree of cross-cutting. Data on religious 
preferences and voter behaviour of the population in general is not available. And 64 is too small 
a sample to establish a qualified or significant result. But the preferences of the MPs may be used 
as an estimate. And the result illustrates the way I assume how a large proportion of the Lebanese 
people are distributed on the two cleavages. We have to take into account that many votes are 
related to independent candidates or small parties also representing specific communal-sectarian 
interests. If I had taken all of these segments into account I would find an even greater 
fragmentation on the cleavages and still a small XC38. Because there seems to be a strong 
tendency to sectarian voting, explained by Dekmejian (1978) and Krayem (n. y), the result of the 
cross-cutting (low degree) of these two cleavages is expected. This low degree of cross cutting is 
related to the high degree of fragmentation on the two cleavages that I found earlier. 1- Σ p2 i  and 
1- Σ p2 j is the probability of a person belong to a given nominal group and it connotes the 
 
38 As an example; Armenian nationalist interests are represented by the Tashnaq Party, not among the eight largest 
parties. Most of the small parties and their candidates seem to represent sectarian interest and are strengthening the 
relation between sectarian community and a specific party or a candidate. One exception may be some of the 
communist partys which seems to be based on a party ideology and segmental cross-cutting membership. But these 
parties have never had much support or been represented in parliament.  
Calculation 4.1: The mathematical formulation of Cross-cutting, XC of party preference by religious 
orientation of parliament members 2005 -2009  
 
XC = Σ p2 i + Σ p2 j  2 Σ p2 ij  
           i           j             i,j      
 
Σ p2 i = (0,1256)2 + (0,2653)2 + (0,1719)2 + (0,0781)2 + (0,1406)2 + (0,0781)2 + (0,1094)2 +  
 i 
(0,0312)2 = 0,0158 + 0,0704 + 0,0295 + 0,006 + 0,0198 + 0,006 + 0,012 + 0,001 = 0,1605 
Σ p2 j = (0,11)2 + (0,2496)2 + (0,2803)2 + (0,2501)2 + (0,0468)2 + (0,0625)2 =  0,0121 + 
 j 
0,0623 + 0,0786 + 0,0626 + 0,0022 + 0,0039 = 0,2217 
Σ p2 ij = (0,11)2 + (0,0156)2 + (0,234)2 + (0,0313)2 + (0,1719)2 + (0,0781)2 + (0,125)2 +  
i,j 
(0,0156)2 + (0,0313)2 + (0,0156)2 + (0,0313)2 + (0,0938)2 + (0,0156)2 + (0,0156)2 + (0,0156)2  
= 0,0121 + 0,0002 + 0,0548 + 0,001 + 0,0295 + 0,006 + 0,0156 + 0,0002 + 0,001 + 0,0002 + 0,001 +  0,0088 + 0,0002 + 0,0002 + 0,0002 = 
0,131 
 
XC = Σ p2 i + Σ p2 j  2 Σ p2 ij = 0,1605 + 0,2217  2 (0,131) = 0,1202  
           i           j             i,j      




fragmentation of the two cleavages. When Σ p2 i and Σ p2 j, is large, then 2 Σ p2 ij is large and XC 
becomes small.  
 
Thus, in reality, the mutually reinforcing of this cleavages do not seem to stand in the way of 
inter (sectarian) party cooperation. There may not be any good alternatives to cooperation or 
other cultural or political cleavages may work as moderators. Two major political blocs are 
observed (polarization). One block consists of pro Syrian forces and the other of anti Syrian 
forces. Related to the sectarian cleavage there is a tendency that more orthodox and traditional 
oriented religious groups supports the pro Syrian movement while the anti Syrian movement is 
supported by more secular groups or religious moderates. Orthodox, conservative Christians 
are mobilized through FPM and SSNP and allied with Shiite Islamist Amal and Hizbullah. The 
other block consists of liberal Sunni Muslims in FM and Druze PSP allied with the western 
oriented Maronite community through LF and Phalange Party.   
 
4.2.2 The socioeconomic  Sectarian Dimension  
Lijphart (1999), Lipset (1960) and Sisk (1996) argue that cross-cutting cleavages can be a 
stabilising factor in divided societies. The class cleavage is mentioned as the cleavage with the 
greatest potential to achieve segmental cross-cutting. Unfortunately, in the case of Lebanon, it 
seems that the class cleavage is mutually reinforcing to the important sectarian-community 
segments. This is illustrated by Dekmejian (1978: 259):  
 
Illustration 4.1 the relation between class and religious preference (Pre 1975-89 civil war)  
 
Richard Hrair Dekmejian 1978 page 259 
 




The Maronites have the biggest middle class while the Shiites and the Palestinians have the 
smallest. In general Christians have a larger degree of the high and middle class while the largest 
proportion of the lower class is Muslims. All thought the model is based on statistics from the 
1970s; there are no reasons to believe that this picture has changes dramatically the last decades. 
The regions with most Muslims in the North, Beeka and South are still the poorest regions as 
shown by resent social-demographic statistics:    
 






Based on statistics by the Republic of Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs (2007): Post Conflict Social and 
Livelihoods Assessment; Social Action Plan: Toward Strengthening Social Safety Nets and Access to Basic Social 
Services. 
 
The four peripheral districts (Qadas) of Bent Jbail, Hermel, Akkar, and Marjayoun had a 
deprivation incidence of more than 60% of the population. A total of 14 Quadas are recognised 
poor districts. Less than 20% of the central districts (Qadas)  Keserwan, Metn and Beirut are 
recognized as rich.  
 
Measurements done by the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affaires shows that the southern and 
eastern region with the larges proportion of Shiites has the lowest economic productivity. The 
Lebanon Mountain which is inhabited by mostly Maronite Christians has a high economic 
activity. The Sunni Muslim citizens are separated between the low income Sunnis of North 
Lebanon and the Sunnis of western Beirut and Urban areas which have a high economic 
activity39. This places the Sunni sect as a whole in a place on the middle of the class cleavage. 
The Druze and the catholic community with its long tradition of western cooperation, which they 
have benefitted from, are also placed in the middle on the scale. The Orthodox Christians are also 
placed in the middle because they are located in both prosperous and poor regions of the country.   
 
 
39 On economic activity by region see appendix, table 7.  
Lower class: Hermel, Akkar, Minyeh, Jezzine, Hasbayya, Bint Jbeil, Tyre, 
Marjeyoun, Baalbeck, Saida-Zahrani, Nabatieh, Zahleh, West Bekaa, Tripoli 
 
Upper class:  Keserwan, Metn, Beirut 




In pre civil war years, as illustrated by Dekmejian, the consequence of the relation between the 
class- and sect cleavage gave a turbulent environment (Illustration 4.2). Many researchers see 
the class cleavage as a possible moderating factor on divided societies if it cross-cuts other major 
social lines of diversity (see Lijphart 1977, Lipset 1960). The Netherlands and Belgium may be 
referred to as less pluralist or segmented than Lebanon due to the cross-cutting between religious 
and class lines (see Lijphart 1977: 79) 
 
Dekmejians illustration of the class-sectarian crosscutting is representative of 21.century 
Lebanon. Thus, social mobilization and urbanization suggests that Lebanon's population is 
shifting rapidly into the category of socially mobilized, from rural to urban residence, and the 
income-growth and per capita income-growth indicators leave no doubt that social mobilization 
is occurring (Hudson 1969: 253-254). Greater Beirut (which now includes the major surrounding 
towns of Mount Lebanon province) has generated and absorbed the prosperity of the 
independence era, while outlying regions in the southern and Northern provinces show little 
material change. These regional imbalances are a formidable obstacle to developing a positive 
national consensus, particularly since the outlying regions are predominantly Muslim(Hudson 
1969: 256). 
 
4.3 Segmented Cleavages Illustrated 
Firstly, I divide the segments between major political blocks, sub- civilization and religious 
relation. Secondly, I relate the rest of the cleavages (party relation, socioeconomic status and 













Illustration 4.2, Societal Segments of 21. Century Lebanon (June 2005 and beyond) 
 
                           Variables: 
                           Sect: High/Low: Western oriented Christian/middle/Eastern oriented Muslim      
                           Party: High: Isolationalist, status quo; Low: Arab Nationalism, reformist 
                           Class: High/Low: living conditions, wealth and income 
                Demographical-Central-Periphery: High: North, central; Low: South, Periphery 
       
                                                                                                  
                                                         High            Christian                             Muslim 
 
                                                                    Maronite, (catholic)         Druze and Sunni   
 Western oriented                     March 14th Phalange, LF                    PSP, FM  
                                                  Movement High                                  Middle  
                                                                    North, Central                   West, Central                         
 Political blocks and                                            
 Sub-civilizational relations                           
                                                                           
                        Orthodox, catholic          Shiite, (Palestinian) 
  Arab oriented                          March 8th   FPM, SSNP                     Amal, Hizbullah 
 Movement Middle                             Low 






The generalised table of Lebanese segmentation or mutual reinforcing cleavages and 
civilizational fault lines above is complex. I believe the model is suitable as an illustration of the 
segmented cleavages of todays Lebanon.   
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Four   
I have explained how the Lebanese society is divided along major cleavages  party system, the 
sectarian and the class cleavage. Besides these cleavages I have explained the role of major 
cultures, civilizations or sub-civilizations and demography in the role of societal heterogeneity in 
Lebanon. The sub-civilizations and nationalist ideologies in Lebanon seem to cross cut religion 
and sects and may of this reason prove that Lebanese consociationalism (confessionalism) is out 
of touch with Lebanese political and cultural environment, if these sub-civilizational segments 




illustrate a major diversity of the Lebanese society. Other political institutions and administrative 
solutions may prove better than the current political system. Here, the consensus model may give 
some solutions, which I will discuss in chapter six. Firstly we need to describe the structure of the 
Lebanese political system and its relation to the divided society it is supposed to represent.      
 
 





























5 Lebanese Consociationalism and the Cleavage Structure  
The illustrations of the major cleavage structure of Lebanon have shown that Lebanon is a highly 
pluralist segmented society. Given this cleavage structure how does the political system perform?  
I will use some of the important characteristics of the consociational model of Arend Lijphart 
(1977) to illustrate how the political system has performed related to Lebanese diversity (Section 
5.3 -5.5). In the first section I explore the development of Lebanese sectarianism and diversity 
related to Lebanese political development. In the second section I explore the consequences of 
the cultural sub-civilizational line and segmented nationalism.  
 
 
5.1 The Institutionalization of Sectarianism  
Karl Marx referred to the Lebanese civil war of the early 1860s as an atrocious outrages of wild 
tribes (quoted by Makdisi 2000: 3). Alternatively it can be seen as a consequence of the 
institutionalizing of Sunni Turk and Maronite dominance in the region, cultural differentiation 
and modernist reforms. Sectarianism became a culture in the aftermath of Maronite and Druze 
elites, European and Ottomans struggled to define an equitable relationship between the Druze 
and Maronite communities to a modernizing Ottoman state (Makdisi 2000: 4).  
  
Sectarianism is a modernist knowledge in the sense that it is produced in the context of European 
hegemony and Ottoman reforms and because its articulators at a colonial (European), imperial 
(Ottoman) and local (Lebanon Mountain) level regarded themselves as moderns who used the 
historic past to justify present claims and future development (Makdisi 2000: 4-5) 
 
Before this process of western inspired modernization, Lebanon Mountain was dominated by 
an elite hierarchy in which secular rank rather than religious affiliation defined politics (Makdisi 
2000: 4). In the nineteen century, Europeans and the Ottoman Empire supported different groups 
in Lebanon. Because of these interferences and interventions on different groups behalf there 
have always existed a disproportional share of power between religious communities. The 
Ottoman millet system favoured the Sunni Muslim communities (see Makdisi 2000: 7). In the 




1800s the French intervened on behalf of the underprivileged Christians. In the French 
colonial the Christian community was given privileges and influence at the expense of the 
Muslims. Sectarianism in Lebanon became a practise by the political sharing of power and 
through the divide of Mount Lebanon into administrative districts based on sectarian boundaries 
in 1842 by a joint European-Ottoman decision (Akarli 2000: 27-28 and Makdisi 2000: 67). The 
1839 Tanzimat introduced the first of these modernist reforms (Makdisi 2000: 2). Aware of 
the Ottoman Empires image as the sick man of Europe, the Sultan and his ministers had 
decreed in 1839 that all subjects were equal before the law regardless of their religion (Makdisi 
2000: 3). This move and the other reforms in the administration were calculated to satisfy 
European demands for the protection of the Christian communities and to inculcate a notion of a 
national and secular subjecthood. Following the civil war of 1860 the area of Lebanon Mountain 
gained more autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. The implementation of the mutasarrifiyya in 
1861 renewed a pattern of modernized elitist sectarian politics (Makdisi 2000: 167). The 
traditionally most political influential groups under Ottoman rule or French mandate have gained 
a considerable amount of power. And they do not want to redistribute this power and positions. 
Therefore, political reforms toward more representative equality between groups are a struggle. 
This is a struggle that have been going on in political arenas and some times in the street.  An 
even further cementation of the sectarian cleavage followed the reforms of 1926, the 1943 
National Pact, and the Taef agreement of 1989.    
 
I have claimed that sectarianism is a construction, developed by institutions and a fragile power 
sharing structure. The institutions and political system have helped shaping sectarian 
identification. Sectarian voting is taking place. In elections, the Lebanese have a self-corrective 
tendency that operates to limit the powers of any other group (Iskandar 2006: 180). In other 
words each sectarian-community votes on the candidates with the same confessional-community 
relation. The fragile balance of power makes sects important, because power is distributed on the 
basis of sects. Belonging to one sect becomes a question of power and influence. Going away 
from a distribution based on confession means a redistribution of power. Thus, any reformist 
needs to take into account this fragile sectarian-communal balance of power in an eventually new 
electoral law and power distribution; no reformist is willing to take the chance of redistributing 
power. This could lead to violence, civil war and eventually the collapse of the Lebanese state. 




Traditional groups and their elites are afraid of loosing influence through the implementation of a 
new system, so instead of supporting political reform in the direction of a form of modern PR 
system, the result of political and constitutional agreements between the groups and the elites of 
the grand coalition, do only result in an increased cementation of the existing confessional based 
political system40.  
 
 
5.2 Implications of the Sub-Civilicational Line and Segmented Nationalism    
The sub-civilizational line and segmented nationalism may be seen as competing cleavages to the 
sectarian line as factors contributing to culturally-segmented pluralism in Lebanon. I have not 
tried to operationalize these cleavages or make any quantitative illustration of these cleavages. 
They are too diffuse and general. The reason for presenting these perspectives of diversity is my 
doubt that the institutionalization of the sectarian line necessarily mirrors the most important 
segments of Lebanon. Major clashes and civil wars between groups can easily be linked to 
different perceptions of nationalism and cultural orientations. Conflicts in the 19th century 1958 
and 1975 to 1989 can all be linked to the sub-civilizational line. Conflicts are linked to different 
perceptions (Pan Arabism, Lebanese nationalism and Islamist) to what Lebanon is, an 
independent nation or just a part of the greater Arab region. The Palestinian cause has divided 
people between western and eastern oriented groups. And different extern actors were involved in 
the conflicts supporting their own group. The Uniate Christian militias were supported by the 
west. The more eastern oriented Orthodox were supported by the Russians. The Sunnis were 
oriented towards Saudi Arabia the political core of their sub-civilization and the Shiites had 
support from the Islamist Iranian regime which represents the core state of the Shiite Islamist. 
The 2005 parliament is polarized between the pro-Syrian opposition, 8. March movement, 
consisting of groups with an eastern orientation and the anti-Syrian government coalition, 14 
March movement, consisting of groups with a traditionally closer contact with the west and have 
a cultural orientation towards the western world. The polarization cross-cuts the religious 
 
40 This statement is strengthened by the recent (May 2008) Doha agreement between the oppositional forces and the 
government, changing the electoral law to secure the opposition veto power in a new 40 member multi confessional 
cabinet.  




Muslim-Christian line and to some extent the sectarian line in the case of the Christian Maronites 
and Catholics41. Therefore, a question of stability concerns the relation between western and 
eastern oriented forces. Thus, stability is linked to the distribution of power between these sub-
civilizations and their perceptions of nationalism and the establishment of peaceful ways for them 
to express their differences.  
 
Sectarianism as an idea does only draw a meaning within a nationalism paradigm, from the 
perspective of being a modern construction and that it appeared in a period of Lebanese identity 
crisis (Makdisi 2000: 8). In other words, Sectarianism can be seen as a metaphor of failed 
nationalism (ibid: 2).  
 
 
5.3 The Performance of Lebanese Consociationalism  
Michael W. Suleiman (1967: 135) describes the Lebanese political system as a preset 
proportional representation system on a communal or religious basis. Lijpharts characteristics of 
a well functional consociational regime consist of a grand coalitions, minority veto ability, and 
proportionality in group representation, and autonomy to the different segments. How has 
Lebanese consociationalism performed related to these main characteristics? In the last section I 
am going to explore how the Lebanese multiparty system relates to Lebanese diversity and 
consociationalism.   
5.3.1 Grand Coalitions and Elite Accommodation  
By being in the government together, parties that do not quite trust each other have an important 
guarantee of political security (Lijphart 1977: 31). These grand coalitions are represented by the 
major groups, parties and their leaders.   
 
 
41 Muslims and Christians are found in both movements. Especially the Maronite and the Catholics are split by this 
political polarization (see chapter 4). Aouns FPM which has contested Christian candidates in most Christian 
districts has contributed to this split. A paradox is that one of FPMs important policies is the disarmament of 
Hizbullah, a party they now are a close allied to in the opposition (See the common agreement between FPM and 
Hizbullah). This Christian-Muslim relationship by oppositional parties may have contributed to stability in the 
politico-sectarian environment.   




An elite cartel structure is reflected through the role of local elites like Shamoun (Sunni), Eddeh 
(Shiite), Gemmayyel (Christian Phalange Party), and Jumblatt (Druze leader, PSP), representing 
the most influential Lebanese sects. Lebanon's multi-confessional elite has its origin in the 
Ottoman period. Under the French Mandate the cartel became institutionalized, and under 
Maronite Christian Bishara Khuri and Sunni Muslim Riyad Sulh the first great coalition was put 
together in the cabinet and the Chamber representing five of the largest communities, in accord 
with the National Pact of 1943 (Dekmejian 1978: 253). In August 1960, the cabinet was 
expanded to eighteen; it co-opted not only most of the main sects and interests, but also gave 
representation to a seventh subgroup, namely the Armenian Orthodox (Dekmejian 1978: 253). In 
June 1973, a cabinet of twenty-two ministers-Lebanon took office under Premier Taqi al-Din 
Sulh. However, these measures were insufficient to prevent the inter-confessional war which 
broke out in 1975 (Dekmejian 1978: 254). Comparing Lebanese reality with the consociational 
model, it appears that the elite cartel operated with some effectiveness promoting co-optation and 
circulation without changing the basic formula established by Articles 24 and 95 of the 1926 
Constitution and by the National Pact of 1943 (ibid)42. 
 
But the first failure of Lebanese consociationalism may have occurred in the elite cartel. The 
people in power have often used their position to change the rules of the political game to secure 
their own positions and avoiding replacement. This attitude towards power sharing has to do with 
tradition and the electoral system. In the confessional system combined with a tribal society a lot 
of power lies with a few peoples. Members of the communities are used to be represented by 
elites from specific, dominant families. This included the resistance of the Maronite-dominated 
elite to effect incremental representational changes, particularly in the Chamber where the 
Christians were numerically dominant(Dekmejian 1978: 278). Crighton (1991:127) writes that 
newly politicized groups may place great strain on institution that is not designed to handle rapid 
change in society.  Consociationalism, that emphasizes the merits of elite consensus could raise 
the suspicions of citizens and provoke a backlash against elite-driven processes (Eisenberg 2002: 
25). In Lebanon the elite cartel and confessional leaders seem not to have had the stabilizing 
effect necessary to make a consociational system work. The resent crisis in government is related 
to the lack of compromise and cooperation between the segmental elites.  
 
42 On Article 24 and 95 of the Lebanese constitution see Lebanese Constitution of 1926 (La Constitution Libanaise). 





5.3.2 Proportionality  
One of Lijpharts criteria of a well functional consociational system implies proportionality in the 
distribution of mandates on basis of group size. Chapter three and four imply that there are 
reasons to question the how proportionality is reflected through the Lebanese political system.  
 
The sharing of position along the sectarian cleavage seems not to have produced proportionality. 
Through time different religious communities have dominated politics and hold a disproportional 
large part of position related to their group size. The 1932 census was from the start claimed to be 
flawed, not reflecting demographical realities. Basing the distribution of position on group size 
may be legitimate if it is based on the assumption that demography is not changing, and an 
assumption that if demography changes  so will the distribution of influence corrected to these 
changes. This is naïve assumptions. And in reality, the Lebanese solution to demographical 
changes seems to have been to ignoring it or deny citizenship to new state members, like the 
increasing number of Shiites (do to higher child birth in the Shiite community) and Palestinians 
(refugees from Palestine and Israel).  
 
Some of the reason for the disproportional distribution of influence is related to the involvement 
of extern actors and a disproportional degree of mobilization and organization of different groups 
through time. Under Ottoman influence Sunnis were given the privileges. Under French 
influence, the French secured for the Christians a majority of state positions and the Christians 
were more mobilized and organized (Phalange and LF) than the Muslims under French mandate. 
Before the civil war the Muslims became mobilized under socialism, pan Arabism and pro 
Palestinian militias, and the Christians were demobilized in the same period. After the civil war 
the Christian community has been fragmented while the Shiite Muslims have been highly 
mobilized under Hizbullah and Amal. And the last decade the Sunni Muslims have succeeded to 
mobilize under influential leaders (The Hariri family and Future Movement). Today the Christian 
Maronites are separated between three or four Leaders and their movements (FPM, Phalange and 
LF). The other Christian groups seem also to be more fragmented supporting many different 
groups (SSNP, Phalange, LF and other). The conclusion is that even if proportionality in the 




distribution of positions is achieved there will always be a disproportional share of influence, 
because of the difference in the degree of how the communities have managed to mobilize and 
organize its political forces. And organized is, of cause, better than unorganized in the struggle 
for influence. Elections of 2000 and 2005 were carried out using the Syrian influenced electoral 
law which has been accused of giving a skewed or disproportional election result (see Iskandar 
2006). The failure of electing a new president in September 2007 is linked to a dispute on power 
sharing between communities. In general every new constitutional reform has further 
strengthened the relation between political representation, power sharing and sectarian-
community.  
 
To illustrate the development of proportionality in the distribution of position, see table 1 and 2 
of the appendix illustrating the development of parliament seat distribution. Is the Taef accord an 
improvement to previous constitutional reforms? Using our estimates of group size and relate 
them to the distribution of seats to the 2005 parliament, lets see how proportional the distribution 
is: 
 









Table 5.1 is based on the European Union Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005.  
Final Report to the Parliamentary election 
 
If the estimates are representative to actual community proportion, there seems be a systematic 
disproportional seat distribution in favour of Christian groups. While the largest Muslim 
communities, Sunnis and Shiites, has a lower proportion of positions related to their proportion of 
the population, all of the Christian communities has a higher proportion of seats related to their 
proportion of the population.  
        Community proportion estimate              Parliament distribution 2005 %       % dist. - estimate 
 
Armenian-catholic: 20 217          0.7                           0.79                                            0.09 
Armenian-orthodox: 90 675        3                              3.9                                              0.09 
Druze: 169 293                            5.6                           6.25                                            0.65 
Greek-catholic: 156 521              5.2                           6.25                                            1.05 
Greek-orthodox: 236 402            7.9                           10.9                                            3.00 
Maronite: 667 556                       22.19                       26.6                                            4.41 
Shiite: 783 903                            26.06                       21.1                                          - 4.96 
Sunni: 795 233                            26.44                       21.1                                          - 5.34 





The Mideast expert Hassan Krayem (1997) describes the relation between Lebanese sectarianism 
and representation. He recognises a low participation at parliamentary elections since 
independence43. Participation is stronger in the rural areas illustrating the strength of sectarian-
communal identities. Since 1922 there have been many changes to the amount and the size of 
electoral districts. Some changes in the divisions have been in inconsistence with sectarian-
communal realities (mixed districts)44. Arend Lijpharts (1977) consociated democracy model 
emphasizes proportionality in culturally divided societies. Thus, few governments and 
parliaments through Lebanons history can be said to have been proportional, representing all of 
Lebanons major communities. Elites and movements have instead used their influence, and 
through making up the rules of the game, dominated other groups. This was made possible by the 
1932 census which has been claimed to be flawed in relation to demographical facts. Since 
sectarian-communities is the basis of representation and power distribution, questions of sectarian 
demography is highly sensitive, and few groups or elites want to take the initiative of a new 
census.  Especially the Maronite community which has dominated politics after independence 
and had privileges under French hegemony is interested in keeping its positions and influence, 
though their community is reduced as a proportion of the total population the last 70 years45. 
Christians and especially the Maronite community wanted privileges due to their claim of 
ethnical and cultural heritage.  
 
Another problem of the distribution on a sectarian basis is, as explained earlier, that major groups 
may be divided along other cleavages than the sectarian. Secular movements and social interest 
groups may represent values and interest that is better reflected through a political ideology and 
the class cleavage. Proportionality in distribution does only become meaningful when relating 
distribution along a main cleavage that mirrors the interest of the important minority groups.  If it 
is difficult to operationalize the major cleavage in a divided society, which may be the case of 
Lebanon, other institutional solutions may be more suitable than group representative rights on a 
 
43 See appendix, table 6.  
44 Mixing electoral districts or through the drawing of electoral district boarders, makes it possible to manipulate 
election result. Minority sectarian-community candidates may be forced to compete for the voters from other 
confessional-communities to be elected. In this way, the interest a given majority group are secured.    
45 Estimates show that the maronite community has a proportion of ca. 22 percent, using the number of confessionals 
registered to the 2005 elections (see the European Union Election Mission to Lebanon 2005: Final Report) 




confessional basis. From another perspective, if diversity is deep along many cleavages, 
distribution of positions may become extremely complicated46 (mirror representation). In chapter 
six I suggest solutions which imply a decline of the institutionalization of any proportional group 
representation between deep religious or cultural cleavages, and rather a strengthening of normal 
PR in a multi party system and segmental integrative solutions.  
 
5.3.3 Mutual Veto  
An important criterion to a well-functional consociational system is veto ability to the major 
segment of society. In Lebanon minority communities has not always been able to veto the 
majority coalition decisions. The recent (2007-2008) government disputes are related to the veto 
question. The Hizbullah-led opposition (8. March Movement) wants a larger share of the cabinet 
positions which would give them a blocking veto. Berri (Amal, speaker of parliament) is among 
the proponents of the 10+10+10 distribution of Cabinet posts that gives the Sunni-led majority, 
the Shiite-led opposition and the Christian president equal shares in a new Cabinet (Bathish 
2008). This split would mean a further cementation of the sectarian line, and gives the opposition 
veto ability in cabinet.  
 
A quite different attitude towards veto ability is expressed by Future Movement MP Hadi 
Hobeish:  a three-way split has but one meaning: the end of the democratic parliamentary 
system in Lebanon and a shift to a confederation (Bathish 2008). Feature Movement has the 
recent years pushed for abolishing of confessionalism, a greater role for modern political parties 
and a western style and competitive PR system47. The three way split would mark a decrease of 
effectiveness of government and an even further cementation of sectarian power sharing. In 
general veto ability is an important security to the minorities. Therefore veto power to major 
groups may be a stabilizing solution. But from a consensus and integrative perspective it does 
strengthen the sectarian based system rather than weakens it, in the case of Lebanon.  
 
 
46 See Will Kymlicka on minority representation in Multicultural Citizenship pp. 138  148. 
47 See Future Movement commitments at http://www.almustaqbal.se/.  
Multi party system and proportional representation in Europe: parliament seats are distributed based on the 
proportion of the total number of votes in supports the different political parties.    




5.3.4 Segmental Autonomy  
Segmental autonomy is to some extent secured in Lebanon through the free establishment of 
communal churches, schools and through decentralization and municipality administration. But 
the degree of segmental isolation is decreasing caused by a growth in urbanization which 
increases the contact between segments on all levels in society. Segmental autonomy is an 
important characteristic of a consociated democracy, and may be stabilizing factor in a 
heterogenic society. However, in Lebanon segmental autonomy seems not to be enough to avoid 
conflict.  
 
While inter-sectarian familiarity may promote coexistence in favourable circumstances, it can 
also breed mutual contempt and increase the possibility of communal conflict. While certain sects 
predominate numerically in various regions, much of the Lebanese population are mixed both in 
urban and rural areas. A growth in modernization and urbanization further reduced the 
separateness of confessional groups, both spatially and culturally. The most favourable condition 
of segmental autonomy, federalism, in Lijpharts model, where segmental cleavages coincide 
with territorial boarders is not achieved in Lebanon. Sectarian isolation may be impossible 
because of long traditions of mixed districts and cross-cutting memberships caused by economic 
growth and urbanization.  
 
5.3.5 The Lebanese Version of a Multiparty System 
The first real attempts to mobilize social forces into politics can be located to the 1920s. From 
the 1920s Lebanon has had a multiparty system. But it was not until the late 1930s that political 
parties began gaining importance and playing some political role in mobilizing the population 
and have an influence on the political process in Lebanon (Krayem)48. 
Kataeb (Phalanges Libanaises), established during the late 1930's and the only significant non-
clandestine party in operation today, is a vehicle for maintaining Maronite interests in an 
independent Lebanon (Crighton 1991: 132). The Gemayel family and the phalange had an 
 
48 This article has no year of publication. See references.  




idealised picture of a Christian Lebanon with geographical boundaries corresponding to Ottoman-
Lebanon Mountain49. Yet even the Kataeb, in its most successful year (1960), placed only six 
men in a parliament of ninety-nine members; and in 1964 it placed only four (Hudson 1969: 257). 
Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist party is distinctly unsuccessful as a party, as Jumblatt 
himself has admitted, but it is effective as a regional-sectarian (interest) grouping. The PSP is an 
ideological cover for Jumblatt's personal following as the dominant leader of the Chouf district 
(Hudson 1969: 257). Chamoun became the ruler of a country polarized by the pro-Western, 
Christian fraction, which controlled the disintegrating coercive instruments of the state, and the 
pro-Nasser insurgents, consisting of many of the leading notables (Hudson 1969: 259). The 
Shiites were almost demobilized in this period in the pre civil war years (Crighton: 133) The 
Shiite political role and representation has passed through stages of silent masses to ascending 
forces to dominant forces represented by Amal and Hizbullah, especially since the mid-1980s 
(Krayem) Amal and Hizbullah have had their disputes on the Palestinian question50, but are today 
united in the opposition together with Auons FPM. Political organizations in Lebanon have been, 
and are still today, tied to sectarian-communities as illustrated in chapter four. The Kataeb party 
gets is support from Maronites (Crighton: 132). And the Druze support the Druze dominated PSP 
and so on. Traditionally, elites from the upper class have dominated party organizations, and this 
may have ignored broader social concerns (ibid). This has led to resentment among the lower 
classes.  
Peoples relation to a specific communal-religious group is reinforced through the party system 
cleavage51. The movements are based on the support of well known individuals in a community. 
It is elite driven parties and not parties supported by masses. They are formed by the families 
who are resourceful and are well known in their local society. Many political positions are held 
by just a few families, and by the same families, from one election to another. The people are not 
voting on parties, and party programs, but on communal elites. We recognise that the party 
system in this respect mirrors a traditional and tribal society. A society based on a few families 
dominance over their community and where much power is concentrated to a few families. Most 
of the political parties are movements rather than parties in their lack of a political programme 
 
49 See chapter 3.  
50 While Amal fought against PLO and Palestinian militias during the 1975-1989 civil war Hizbullah supported them 
(see Mackey 2006).   
51 See chapter 4.  




and a clear ideology. Some movements have been mobilized by intellectuals with a certain 
ideological (communist parties) base, but these parties have never really gained a lot of support 
and influence in this sectarian based party system52. 
In Lebanon, the sectarian element remains the strongest determining factor of party politics. Most 
parties and political movements, either in ideology or in practice, are associated with a single sect 
or an ethnic group. The secular parties have not been able yet to play a national role and the trend 
in recent years, especially in the post-Civil War period (1990-to present), have been to 
marginalize these parties, as is the case with leftist parties. The trend has also been for parties to 
become vehicles for rising militia forces and leaders. The electoral systems in Lebanon have 
contributed to the marginalization and weakening of the political parties in many different ways. 
Hassan Krayem53 explains that the relatively weak political role of the political parties in 
Lebanon is related to the structure of these parties, which has remained highly confessionalist and 
depended heavily on individual traditional communal leaders. They represent first their sect and 
community and thirdly a political party and a party program. In other words, it seems that 
traditional and neo-traditional forces and local elites have been emphasized, rather than political 
parties.  
Hassan Krayem describes the changes of the relative strength of the different movements of the 
Lebanese party system through time. Political party representation in the parliament has changed 
in terms of sectarian affiliation. In the pre-Civil War period, the Christian political parties were 
strongly represented, relative to the unorganized and under-represented Islamic political forces. 
The Islamic community was influenced by Pan-Arabism, and this was reflected in the general 
mass movements and dominant political currents, especially Nasserism. In the post-Civil-War 
period, the Islamic parties became well represented and well organized, in contrast to the 
unorganized and underrepresented political movements and currents in the Christian areas, 
especially the phenomenon of Aounism, a movement of supporters of General Michael Aoun, the 
previous army leader and head of the transitional military government. A split between Christian 
communities is also evident under the 2005 election. Aouns FPM contributed to this split by 
competing against the other Christian elites and movements in Christian areas. The Christians are 
 
52 Communist parties are examples of ideological based parties which never have been influential (see appendix 
table 4 and 5).  
53 This article has no year of publication. See references.   




split by different concepts of nationalism  Lebanese nationalism, Syrian and Arabic 
nationalism54.  
Because sectarian identity has been more generally more important than political ideology, leftist 
movements fighting for social and economic development have not been successful in getting 
through with their programme. Socialist movements were gaining support in the 1950s and 60s 
but the movements were disrupted by an increased unstable situation in the country caused by the 
Cairo agreement and international conflict  the Palestinian-Israel war. Members of the idealist 
and socialist movement ran off to support their specific communities and sectarian militias when 
political-sectarian tensions were increasing in the pre civil war years. Dubar and Nasr write that, 
social identity patterns were developing along horizontal class lines, but this development was 
aborted by the outbreak of the civil war and quick reaffirmation of rigid sectarian divisions and 
identity patterns (Dubar 1982: 106).  
 
Still to day there are major challenges facing political movements in their process of mobilizing 
social groups and gaining influence in Lebanese politics. Political parties traditionally have a low 
influence on Lebanese politics. The confessional based political system is to blame for 
undermining mobilizing forces and political movement, especially those who have a secular base.  
 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Five  
It seems that, on the one hand, that traditional loyalties and an institutionalization of segmented 
society exists alongside, on the other hand, liberal democracy, modernism and an increasing 
secular civil society and political organizations. This seems like a contradiction, but this dualism 
has to do with a carefully balanced power distribution.    
  
 
The question asked is to what extent the confessional system is suitable mirroring the diversity of 
todays Lebanon. The constitution of 1926, the census from 1932, the independence from France 
 
54 See chapter 3 and 4. This cleavage of different nationalist ideas which in some extent is reinforcing to cultural 
cleavages may be defined as segmented nationalism.  




in 1943, the reforms of Shihab of the 1950s, the civil war, the Taif accord from 1989 and the 
independence from Syria in 2005 are all important benchmarks. These events have had an impact 
on the formulation of the electoral law making the basis for power distribution and the stability of 
the fragile power balance structure between sectarian groups in Lebanon. There are reasons to 
believe that a development towards a modern party system would mark the end of the 
confessional system or tradition of distributing mandates and influence based on religious 
diversities. The Lebanese system does fit to a consociational model. But a critical factor to 
instability has been the disproportionally share of political influence between groups.  
 
Movements and new political and secular forces of Lebanon are giving us an impression through 
speech and documents that they are fed up with the sectarian based institutions of Lebanon (like 
the Future Movement).  Confessionalism in Lebanon has not mirrored the social and political 
environment. But are the Lebanese movements doing whats necessary in order to achieve the 
goal of an abolishment of the sectarian system? A pure PR system depends on a modern party 
system. Many movements policies are in favour of a reform, but are the pure PR system the right 
solution? I will explore how the consociational system can function satisfactorily by balancing 
liberal and integrative democratic institution with pluralist, consociated democracy.  




6 Between Lebanese Consociationalism and Consensus 
Democracy: Institutional Solutions to Diversity 
Pluralist theory like consociationalism, group-differentiated citizenship theory and consensus 
theory address similar problems but present different solutions. Both Samuel P. Huntington 
(1968) and Arend Lijphart (1977) examine how to ensure democratic governance in culturally-
segmented societies. Dahls theory applies to pluralistic but not deeply divided  culturally-
segmented societies. Cross-cutting theory may illustrate the degree of pluralism in Lebanon. This 
helps us towards more qualified perspectives on what the Lebanese institutions may be able to 
achieve in representing the major segments of society and moderating tensions between groups 
and tensions between opposition and government.  In present Lebanon, pluralism and democracy 
exist without a prior legitimacy or an integrated culture (Hudson 1969: 146). 
 
Pluralist arguments like the ones found in the consociational Theory apply to societies more 
segmented than that of the consensus model. Two different perspectives on stable democracy 
emerge from the two theories. Consociationalism favour segmental autonomy and the 
institutionalization of major cleavages in society. The consensus model is also expected to apply 
to pluralist societies but solves diversity and stability questions by emphasize an environment of 
mutual understanding to reach some form of consensus among the different groups on major 
issues. This chapter explores some alternative institutional solutions to the segmented pluralism 
of Lebanon  inspired by cross-cutting theory and integrative arguments represented by the 
consensus model of democracy. I will first reintroduce some of the major pluralist arguments 
which the present system is founded on.  
 
6.1 Consociationalism and Social Pluralist Arguments to the 
Institutionalization of Diversity 
In many pluralist societies there are a close relationship between party preference and religion55. 
In a plural society like Lebanon segmental cleavages are politically salient and coincide with 
 
55 In Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, a Comparative Exploration (1977), the Benelux countries are 
described as pluralist countries where there is a close relationship between religious and party preference. In the 




party system cleavages. Therefore there is no guarantee that todays minority is tomorrows 
majority. One of the legitimizing arguments of the majority model of democracy is that the (two) 
major movements of society are shifting in their role as opposition and government. Legitimacy 
of the consociational democracy on the other hand, is sustained by letting all major segments of 
societies to be represented in the cabinet at all times, through the forming of grand coalitions. For 
deeply plural societies, the government versus opposition norm prescribed by normative 
democratic theory may in practice be a principle of exclusion56 (Lijphart 1977: 31). Sisk (1996: 
5) explains that:  
 
Consociational power sharing can be conceived of as an overarching framework in which 
groups are the analytical construct between which a set of political power interconnections 
reverberate. Groups are represented as groups (usually through ethnically exclusive political 
parties), in essence as building blocks of a common society.  
 
High degree of Cross-cutting is less likely to occur in a deeply segmented society like Lebanon. 
Lijphart argue that applying clear boundaries between the segments have the potential to reduce 
hostility between groups. Major cleavages not institutionalized may contribute to conflict because 
people may find other channels than the political to resolve differences (Lijphart 1977: 86). A 
high degree of fragmentation on the cleavages may also contribute to conflicts. The tension 
produced by fragmentation or heterogeneity is solved through segmental isolation which reduces 
the contact between segments57. The notion of overlapping memberships argues that mutual 
contact fosters mutual understanding. Lijphart argues that this may be the case of relatively 
homogeneous societies but not in the case of deeply pluralist societies like Lebanon (ibid: 88).  
 
But what if consociationalism is based on the wrong assumptions on which cleavages of society 
constitute the major diversity; the electoral system is flawed and has a low degree of legitimacy; 
and the segments of society are not possible to isolate from each other?  
 
cross-cutting theory of Lijphart (1977), Rae and Taylor (1970), these to cleavages are described as mutually 
reinforcing.  
56 Majoritarian rule are unable to meat the demands of the fractionalized society. Majoritarian rule do not guarantee 
minorities, representative rights (see Lijphart 1977).  
57 Segmental autonomy is achieved in Lebanon by granting the major religious-communities their own churches, 
schools and local laws (Lijphart 1977: 147-150). Segmental autonomy along a strict territorial line is called 
federalism (see Lijphart 1977: 88-89). 






6.2 Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Consensus (integrative) Arguments 
Sisk (1996) explains that integrative power sharing perspectives pursue the goal of eliciting some 
degree of "cross-cutting" of cleavages that allow members of groups to generate and sustain 
affinities that move over and beyond ethnic group politics, thereby in effect promoting political 
stability. Integrative or pluralist approach seeks to make political organizations that mirror ethnic 
group differences (Sisk 1996: 7). 
 
There are four main reasons to believe that the consociational democracy of Lebanon do not 
mirror the segments of society. The first reason is related to the lack of segmental isolation; the 
second reason has to do with the failure of the grand coalition to be representative balanced; 
Thirdly, there seems to be a trend of one group dominating other groups through time making 
Lebanese consociationalism disproportional; and fourthly, as illustrated in chapter four, Lebanon 
may be divided along other deep cleavages (class, cultural sub-civilizations, east or western 
orientation and different nationalist views) than the sectarian which consociationalism of 
Lebanon is based on.  
 
I assume by this last reason that sectarianism in Lebanon is a modern construction. And the 
constitution and electoral law fail to stabilize the fragile politico-sectarian environment because it 
is flawed (by the 1932 census) and based on these wrong assumptions of Lebanese diversity. The 
different cultural orientation or sub civilizations  does not follow a strict sectarian line. 
 
From a consociationalist perspective the solution would be to institutionalize all major cleavages 
of society. From a cross-cutting and an integrative theoretical perspective it would have a 
stabilizing effect on society if main cleavages of society were cancelling each other out through 
cross-cutting. But as illustrated in chapter four the important party system cleavage and the 
sectarian cleavage are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting in Lebanon. Major conflicts through 
time are linked to different perspectives of nationalism  segmented nationalism. And the 
political blocs in Lebanese politics today seem to be reinforcing to some form of sub-




civilizational cleavage. These major cultural and political cleavages, I assume, do not have the 
potential to be moderating. And since segmental autonomy and isolation is such important 
characteristics of the consociated democracy, it seems necessary that the eventually abolishment 
of segmental isolation must be replaced by other stabilizing factors and institutions to this 
power balance issue. I have explored some integrating solutions.  
 
6.2.1 Moderation of Diversity through Cross-Cutting of Cleavages 
From a cross-cutting theoretical perspective cleavages may cancel each other out when they are 
cross-cutting. Some democracy theoreticians argue that democracy is impossible if segments of 
society are not cross-cutting the party system cleavage. A stable democracy requires that all 
major parties include supporters from all segments of society (see Dahl 1982: 40, Lipset 1960: 
31).   
 
In the case of Lebanon the religious cleavage has been institutionalized through the confessional 
system. There is a certain extent of federalism and segmental autonomy. But the segments are not 
isolated from each other by territory because many districts are mixed. Instead there exist 
invisible borders between religious communities. Through the years the contact between the 
segments has increased on all levels of society through urbanization, the decline of the feudal 
system and traditional elite hierarchies, and an some degree of cross-cutting of memberships 
through party organization and interest groups58. Present Lebanon, following social and 
demographic trends, segmental isolation has become impossible. Segmental isolation, in the 
sense that Lijphart believes contribute to stability in segmented societies, may not apply to 
modern Lebanon. There is a power struggle between traditional ruler families and new forces in 
politics. These new forces represented through interest organisations and secular political 
organizations need to be included into political processes. The institutional solutions must be able 
to balance the power between all of the major politico-sectarian forces and segments.           
 
 
58 Sunni dominated FM has some Shiite members and is constituted as a secular party. Labour unions and firms are 
organizations with cross-segmental memberships. Many people have moved from the rural to the central and urban 
areas through the last half a century (see Mackey 2006).  




6.2.2 Social Corporatism and Institutionalization of the Class Cleavage   
Interest group corporatism is one of the characteristics of the consensus democracy model (see 
Lijphart 1999: 37-38). Hudson is concerned with factors that contribute to Lebanese political 
stability, and mentions that economic wealth is associated to stable democracy (Hudson 
1969:146). In European countries economic development and allocation policies have made the 
class cleavage cut a cross cultural and religious cleavages, and may have moderated tensions 
between different ethnic and religious groups. Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) argues that the class 
cleavage has a moderating effect on segmentation if the class cleavage cross-cuts the segmented 
cleavages. 
 
Labour unions and companies are examples of entities where membership may criss-cross each 
other on cultural and religious cleavages. When labour unions are influential in politics, religious 
cleavages may be moderated because the labour unions may consist of people from all 
confessional communities. The class cleavage has the potential to become cross-cutting to the 
major segments of society because one persons wealth and thereby class identity, is easier to 
change than a persons religious and cultural preferences.  
 
In Lebanon the class cleavage has been reinforcing to the sectarian cleavage. Following the First 
World War, Lebanon had an economic growth and the politico-sectarian environment was 
peaceful. Firstly, during the economic decline in the 1950s sectarian and nationalist ideological 
conflicts increased. This does not mean that there is a direct connection between economic wealth 
and stable political and sectarian environment, but high degree of stability, during times of 
economic wealth, both in Lebanon and in many other countries, makes the relation likely59. 
Besides economic wealth and allocation of economic recourses the class cleavage can be a 
stabilising force if it is institutionalized. By mobilizing social movements through a form of 
social corporatism the class cleavage may function as a moderating factor to the politico-sectarian 
milieu. Workers unions represent such a cross-cutting of memberships. A workers union with a 
multi sectarian member base have the potential to get the credibility and support to make the 
 
59 Based on a study of 135 countries from over a 40 year period  1950 to 1990, Prezewovsky and Limongi (1997) 
found that no country with a per capita income of under $ 6,066 (1975: 165-166), no democracy failed or declined 
significantly.  




class cleavage moderate the sectarian cleavage, by representing all workers and move society 
towards economic equality.      
 
An increase of economic equality in the case of Lebanon may be done by strengthening the living 
conditions of the communities in the poor regions of North, South and East Lebanon. Times of 
democratic and politico-sectarian stability have been connected to periods of economic 
development and wealth (1920-1960). Though, the distribution of wealth has always been 
skewed. The Lebanese society is based on a liberal marked economy (see Iskandar 2006). Little 
recourse is allocated through the Lebanese state and Lebanon uses a marginal portion of GDP on 
social services (see social action plan). The Lebanese federation of labor unions (GFLU) has been 
claimed not to represent workers interests, because the labor unions in some extent follow 
sectarian lines and are dominated by the politico-sectarian fractions of Amal, Hizbullah and 
SSNP (see yaLibnan 2008). Leftist parties have also failed in representing worker interests 
because of their sectarian structure. The Progressive Socialist Party and other socialist parties of 
the 50s and 60s did not have the credibility and sufficient support. PSP was representing the 
interest of the Druze elite Jumblatt. PSP and most other parties were highly sectarian, and 
sectarian communal identity was a stronger characteristic of the party than its socialist ideology. 
Both Pan Arabism and Communism were international or regional ideologies that to some degree 
moderated sectarian tensions by cross-cutting the sectarian cleavage. But the people were also 
separated by these nationalist and political ideological issues. Eventually, both communism and 
Pan Arabism were reduced as major sources of identity after the collapse of communism and the 
increase of domestic and international conflicts like the Palestinian  Israel conflicts.      
 
Social forces had problems mobilizing during the 50 and 60s due to the lack of 
institutionalization of the class cleavage. Labor unions lacked influence and few major political 
movements represented the lower class and workers because of their sectarian fundament and 
their priorities to represent sectarian-community interest and often the interest of elites. Since the 
political channel was closed to them, social movements were more likely to choose other 
channels of influence, like protest and violence.60.  
 
 
60 The mobilization of social forces is related to the major conflict of 1958. 




Times of peace in Lebanon are related to times of economic wealth and prosperity. But there is a 
strong relation between wealth and development like Lipset (1960) argues then there is reason to 
doubt if it is consociationalism that has stabilized the complex politico-sectarian milieu of 
Lebanon, but rather economical factors. From another perspective, times of economic growth 
have usually been concentrated to the central area of Beirut, and the periphery of the country has 
not benefitted from this growth. This means that social tensions may have been increasing also 
during times of general economic development.     
     
 
6.3 Institutional Solutions to Lebanese Diversity: Institutional Engineering  
The central question of political engineering is: what kinds of institutions and practices create 
an incentive structure for ethnic groups to mediate their differences through the legitimate 
institutions of a common democratic state? (Sisk 1996: 33). 
 
I will propose some institutional solutions that may apply to the segmented society of 21st century 
Lebanon, given its cleavage structure and fragile balance of power. The solutions are inspired by 
the consensus model by Lijphart which weights national parties, strong bicameralism, 
corporatism and segmental integrative solutions.  
 
6.3.1 Electoral Law Adjustments and Representation 
Are there measures that can be done to strengthen the representative institutions and legitimacy 
of Lebanese consociationalism? Sectarianism in Lebanon is cemented through 150 years of 
modernist reforms (see chapter 3 and Makdisi 2000). Therefore it is naïve to believe that 
sectarianism can be removed or replaced easily. Electoral reforms have to take into consideration 
the fragile sectarian balance of power before making any drastic change to the way power is 
distributed. The European Union Observation Mission to Lebanon (2005) has suggested some 
solutions to how the Lebanese system may become more fair and more modern (downplay 
sectarianism and primordial identities). The problem of the system today is that parliamentary 
seats are assigned before the voters have been able to express their preferences; Seats seem to be 




assigned to candidates before Election day and there is a problem of non contested candidates in 
some districts; the current electoral system does not respect the principle of equality of votes; and the 
delimitation of electoral constituencies does not respect this principle (The European Union 
Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005: 6). The observation missions conclusion is to redraw the 
electoral map (increase the number of electoral districts), improve representation, accountability, and 
voter turnout (ibid).    
 
The conclusions by the observation mission seem reasonable. Lebanon is today divided into five 
electoral regions. Reducing the geographical size of regions (and increasing the number) would 
improve voter awareness. This change would increase the voters interest and boost election 
turnout as more communal interests or issues rise to the national level. It would also increase 
politicians accountability to their constituents (ibid: 7). The number of constituencies should allow 
for a sufficient number of seats in each constituency in order to have representatives from each of 
them reflecting all major political views in the respective region. A certain number of seats could be 
distributed nationwide to achieve an even more proportional representation. Because Lebanon is such 
a diverse society it is crucial to have as many different views as possible represented in Parliament. 
Delimiting electoral district boundaries should be done, serving the principles of equal vote, and 
adequate (proportional) political representation (ibid: 8).  
 
The Siniora Cabinet (2007-) has decided to draft a new law for elections. They want the election 
result to better reflect individual choices and they want the free establishment of political parties 
(see FMs commitments). The electoral law is in the core of the 2007-2008 political crises (no 
new president after Lahoud is elected). The lack of a president and an ineffective parliament 
creates a political power vacuum that puts to the test the stability of the politico-sectarian 
environment. One proposition regarding the electoral law is called the "three-way split". A 
"three-way split" between the Sunni, Shiite and Christian sects in a new Cabinet was at the core 
of the disagreement between the assassinated former Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel and 
Hizbullah's resigned ministers in the present Cabinet (Bathish 2008). Hizbullah are pushing for 
more positions and veto ability61.    
 
 
61 It seems that the Hizbullah-led opposition are going to achieve this through the Doha agreement. (See Hussein 
Abdallah: The Daily Star, Lebanon May 21st 2008). Of the 40 positions in the new unity cabinet the oppositions will 
have a sufficiently large proportion of the seats to have a blocking veto if necessary.   




6.3.2 Strong Bicameralism 
Strong bicameralism is a separation of parliament into two chambers elected on different basis. 
Lebanon has only one chamber in Parliament. Strong bicameralism applied to a relative 
heterogeneous state work as a special representational institution in favour of minorities in 
society. The implementation of bicameralism to a consociational state works in a different 
manner. Applied to the case of Lebanon one chamber may be elected on the basis of traditional 
sectarian line including dominating families and sectarian communities. And one chamber 
elected on the basis of party politics and a pure PR system. This will include the secular political 
parties. In the case of Lebanon bicameralism would have the opposite effect on representation as 
bicameralism originally is tended to. It may reduce group identities in favour of party politics and 
national parties, because one chamber is not elected on the basis of group diversity. This holds if 
the second chamber is elected on the basis of pure PR without the group specific distribution 
based on sectarian communities, but rather on the basis of communities of common ideology 
and interests. At the same time it does not abolish the confessional communities, but it reduces 
the influence of sectarian elites to the advantage of non traditional party leaders and party 
members. The solution takes into account the fragile balance of power between sectarian 
communities and their elites, simultaneously as it marks a modernizing reform giving room for a 
new form of party and ideology based politics and representation. 
 
 
6.3.3 National Parties 
The careful adaption of modern and secular parties is necessary to include newly mobilized 
forces into politics which base their party policies on political interest and ideology and has a 
cross-segmental member basis. Alternative to proportional representation based on the 
distribution of mandates along the sectarian line, mandates can be elected on the basis of party 
preference and political interest. This would mark a decline of the sectarian cleavage. The 
political parties of Lebanon today are highly sectarian but they do also represent specific 
nationalist, social and other ideologies.  
 
Political parties are responsible of recruiting, nominate, and campaign to elect public officials, 
drawing upon similar ideological, economical or social outlooks to identify issues and mobilize 




support. The creation of national based political parties would encourage the identification and 
promotion of national issues, which would in turn encourage individuals to vote beyond sectarian 
loyalties (Final Report by the Canadian Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005). 
 
Are there trends in direction of political development: the creation of modern- western inspired 
PR multiparty system? From statistics in appendix table 4, notice that there has been an overall 
increase in party member representation in parliament. There may be changes taking place, from 
traditional elites representation to modern representation where political parties are given a 
greater role. Younger non traditional party leaders like Saad Hariri (32 years of age), and parties 
with a secular program (FM, FPM and PSP) seem to have a great deal of influence. Most parties 
are in favour of the abolishment of the sectarian based political and representative institutions, 
from the judgement of some of their party programs (see the party programmes of Hizbullah, 
FPM and PSP).  From the FPM charter: Free Patriotic Movement aims at renewing the political 
life in Lebanon on the bases of knowledge, ethics, progressiveness and the emancipation of the 
Lebanese individual; Promote institutional functions on the basis of competence and the 
implementation of the principal of liability and accountability (FPM charter).  
 
To secure that the party-system are influential in the future there is a need for strengthening political 
parties legal status  there rights of establishment (see Union Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005: 
9). If the party member basis is becoming less sectarian grounded and we find a significant 
volatility62 between future elections, this will strengthen our belief that a development to a 
modern party system is taking place and the legitimacy of the confessional based political system 
will decrease. Then some form of modernization and secularization has taken place, since this 
development mentioned will involve structural differentiation and a further separation between 
religion and the political system.  
 
I believe that the inclusion and participation of modern (secular) political parties and through a 
distribution of mandates that reflect major political and social differences of society (and to a less 
 
62 Voter volatility explains in which extent voters tend to shift their loyalty between parties from election to election. 
The degree of volatility in Lebanon may be used as a measurement of decrease of sectarian voting and the increase 
of cross-cutting memberships. Unfortunately are the statistics necessary to measure volatility unavailable.  The data 
necessarily to make these measurements are the voters religious preference and party preferences from to elections 
or more.  




extent on sectarian diversities) would challenge the traditional confessional based system and 
eventually secure a more fair power distribution (of parliamentary, cabinet seats and 
administrative positions) and involve the Lebanese into politics in a peaceful manner.  
  
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks to Chapter Six  
This chapter has evaluated some possible solutions to deep diversity. The consensus model of 
democracy is the main source. I have also argued from a cross-cutting cleavage theoretical 
perspective. The main statement is, giving the political trends and cleavages of Lebanon, that 
segmental integration is better then segmental autonomy. Relevant solutions derived from the 
consensus model are solutions that through time could remove or at least radically reduce 
confessionalism. My interpretation of the bicameral system and the cross-cutting memberships of 
corporatism and secular parties may have this effect.  
 
Consociationalism of Lebanon has been organized on wrong conclusions concerning Lebanese 
diversity. Still this regime may have contributed to preserving peace, democratic organization 
and stability better than alternative political regimes. Times of conflict follow times of 
consociational state failure, disproportionally, group domination, corruption, and ineffective 
mobilization of important groups. There are strong indications that the relationship between the 
individual and the state has become more important than before. A peaceful Lebanon lies in 
horizontal integration between communities and a more dynamic state-society relation.  
 
Some democracy theoreticians argue that the consociational state is not a democracy, but more of 
a confederation. Through grand coalitions, the groups of society are never in opposition and they 
are never in a majority. The argument states that the lack of competition is a lack of democracy. I 
am not going to argue in which extent Lebanon is a democracy; I would rather argue that the 
political system of Lebanon may be the best one considering its alternative. As long as group 
specific representation based on sectarian lines of diversity makes Lebanon a stable, peaceful and 
that fundamental civil and political rights are secured, then consociationalism is the right system 
in the case of Lebanon. Democracy is a means to secure political and civil liberties. Some times 




democracy does not secure fundamental rights and some times dictatorship does. Some 
institutional solutions represented through the consensus model may be used to modify Lebanese 
consociationalism to better fit to the politico-sectarian trends and environment of modern 
Lebanon. These institutions are supposed to encouraging policies strengthening social identities 
other than religious and encourage cross-cutting memberships. The distribution of resources 
based on need (class cleavage) would make the important class-cleavage cross-cut the cultural-
religious segments of Lebanon.  
 
Summing up, consociational power-sharing in Lijpharts model and the way consociationalism 
functions in Lebanon seek to reduce religious tensions by minimizing the need for interaction 
between ethnic groups, except at the elite level. The consensus or integrative power-sharing 
institutions seeks to minimize conflict by creating cross-cutting cleavages. I have argued in 












7 Conclusion  
So how is the Lebanese society divided? I have described society as divided into four main 
segments; Eastern and Western oriented Muslims or Christians. Muslims with a western 
orientation is the Druze and the Sunni community. The Christians are split in their view of 
western versus eastern cultural orientation. The Christians with a western orientation is to be 
found in Christian catholic communities. Eastern orientated Christians are to be found in the 
orthodox but also Christian Catholic population. The Eastern oriented Muslim is found in 
southern and eastern Lebanon and supports the sectarian Amal party and the Islamism nationalist 
Hizbullah and they are mostly Shiite Muslims. I argue that the sub-civilizational cleavage is a 
major cultural cleavage that may be more descriptive of Lebanese diversity than the sectarian 
line. The argument is supported by the recent political polarization. Segmentation implies that 
cleavages are reinforcing to each other. This is, unfortunately, the case of major cleavages of 
Lebanon: the class cleavage seems to be reinforcing to the sectarian cleavage, which again is 
mutually reinforced by the party system cleavage.  
 
If you are a Shiite you vote for Shiite movements if you are a Christian you probably vote for the 
Phalange party or one of the other Christian sectarian parties. The Sunnis vote for the Sunni 
dominated Feature movement. In other words, the country is sectarian and segmented through 
both representative institutions and through voting behaviour. Thus I have stated that 
sectarianism is a construction. Still confessionalism has been more and more cemented from one 
political reform to the next. This has to do with the fragile balance of power and less to do with a 
deep sectarian diversity. The fragile power balance makes elites and reformist less likely to 
propose a new distribution of positions, not based on traditional sectarian structures.   
 
How does the consociational political system of Lebanon, through its representative institutions, 
reflect the major diversities of the Modern Lebanese society? When constructing the sectarian 
line of diversity in the mid nineteen century, the Ottomans and Europeans indirectly reduced the 
influence of groups separated along other cleavages, like the class cleavage and by political 
ideologies. This is why the 1861 civil war is told as a story of sectarian conflict and tribal 
disruption, and not as a revolt against feudalism. The conflict was manifested through a sectarian 




clash because the sectarian cleavage was the only cleavage institutionalized. Corporate and party 
channels did not exist to handle political and social difference.    
 
The breakdown of the Lebanese state in later years can be linked to the lack of including newly 
mobilized forces into politics. Class differences and other political differences were manifested 
through sectarian violence because the class cleavage had not been sufficiently institutionalized 
and social forces had not gained influence through the political channel63. Corporatist and the 
party organization channel would have been able to express class interest in a peaceful manner if 
they had been influential. Different nationalistic and ideological views would also be reflected 
via the party system. The sectarian system represents first of all sectarian community- and elite 
interests and this overshadows other political interests. The conclusion is that stability is 
connected to the institutionalization of the class cleavage and not the institutionalization of 
cultural and religious cleavages or increased segmental isolation. The class cleavage would, if 
institutionalized, have a stabilizing effect on ethnic, religious and deep cultural cleavages, 
because the memberships of social corporatist and socialist parties may cross-cut the religious 
and cultural cleavages. 
 
Lebanese diversity favour some form of power sharing solutions, Lebanons confessionalism may 
not prove to be the best way of representing the major lines of diversity or segments of society. I 
believe Lebanese sectarianism, in some extent, has been constructed. I believe an increase of 
mass politics and party ideology is part of the solution. A basis for party ideology may be found 
in nationalist and social reformist agendas. Besides representing sectarian interests Druze PSP 
has a socialist agenda, and the Sunni dominated Future Movement are constituted as a secular 
movement and has a liberal ideology. Also the oppositional party FPM expresses a liberal 
ideology through their programme. But until now political movements have had a weak position 




63Crighton (2006: 161) explains that the western press reported the outbreaks of fighting (in the 1970s  80s) as a 
civil war between Muslims and Christians. But no of the fighting camps was really constituted on a communal-
religious basis. The civil war may have had more of the characteristics of a sectarian clash later on, but the sectarian 
cleavage was not the reason to the outbreak.   




The confessional system is described both as a stabilising and destabilising factor on the 
Lebanese society. Injustice in the confessional system explains some of the tension between the 
confessional groups. In this thesis I mention the distribution of power between the different 
groups after the implementation of the Taif Accord of 1989. This distribution has more 
legitimacy than earlier laws. Now, parliamentary seats are shared more evenly between 
Christians and Muslims than after 1943. The confessional system in Lebanon is an extremely 
fragile distribution of power between confessional groups.  Strong arguments exist both in favour 
of, and against, an electoral reform. Much could be done to make the system fairer, in relation to 
proportionality and by increasing the influence of social and secular forces, but not without 
destabilizing the fragile balance of power between the sectarian communities and their elites.   
 
Which alternative institutions may contribute to a more fair (proportional) representation on 
behalf of the segments of Lebanese society? Lijpharts model states that increased segmental 
contact and the decrease of segmental autonomy can lead to conflict. Integrative perspectives 
emphasize the segmental integration and the cross-cutting of cleavages. I have given some 
integrative propositions. This is because I believe the institutionalization of major cultural or 
religious cleavages, which consociationalism implies, complicates the state structure and is not 
necessarily in favour of proportionality and stability. First of all the system is not up to date with 
demographical realities and second, people are segmented along other cleavages than the 
sectarian. Besides strengthening organizations with a cross-cutting membership, representative 
solutions mentioned are a special version of bicameralism, the inclusion of national and secular 
parties and a new electoral reform which downplays the role of sectarian identity.  
 
An interesting theme in the extension of this thesis would be to explore how to implement 
integrative, modernist reform to the Lebanese sectarian based system without provoking too 
many traditional privileged groups. As explained in chapter five, the trend is that the Lebanese 
sectarian system has been cemented from reform to reform. This trend has to change if the 
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Table 1: Assembly of Representatives 
Parliament of Lebanon Seat Allocation 
Confession Before Taif After Taif 
Maronite 30 34 
Greek Orthodox 11 14 
Greek Catholic 6 8 
Armenian Orthodox 4 5 
Armenian Catholic 1 1 
Protestant 1 1 
Other Christians 1 1 
Total Christians 54 64 
Sunni 20 27 
Shi'a 19 27 
Druze 6 8 
Alawite 0 2 
Total Muslims 45 64 
Total 99 128 





Table 2: Election result 2005 
Summary of the 29 May-20 June 2005 Lebanese National Assembly election results 
Alliances Seats Parties Votes % Seats
Future Movement (Tayyar Al Mustaqbal)    36 
Progressive Socialist Party (Hizb al-Taqadummi al-Ishtiraki)    16 
Lebanese Forces (al-Quwāt al-Lubnāniyya)    6 
Qornet Shehwan Gathering  




Independents (Tripoli Bloc)    3 
Democratic Renewal (Tripoli Bloc)    1 
Democratic Left (Tripoli Bloc)    1 
March 14 Alliance 72 
Independents    3 
Amal Movement (Harakat Amal)    14 
Party of God (Hezbollah)    14 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-souri al ijtima'i)    2 
Resistance and Development Bloc 35 
Others    5 




Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyar Al-Watani Al-Horr)    14 
Skaff Bloc    5 
Change and Reform Bloc 21 
Murr Bloc    2 
Total   128 













Source: European Union Observation Mission to Lebanon 2005, Final Report on the Parliamentary Elections. 
 
 
Table 4: Political Parties in Lebanon (1992). 
Political Party Representation in 1992 Parliament Confessional Base and Region 
Ideological 
Orientation 
Progressive Socialist Party 4 Deputies Mount Lebanon (Chouf and Alley) Druze 
Socialist Member of 
International 
Socialism 
Social National Syrian Party 6 Deputies Secular with heavy representation in the Greek Orthodox Community (Mount Lebanon Koura in the north, and Beirut) 
National "Syrian 
Nationalism" 
Baath Party (pro-Syrian) 2 Deputies Secular National "Arab Nationalism" 
Amal Movement 4 Deputies South Lebanon "Shia'a" Sectarian 
Hizbollah 8 Deputies South Lebanon & Biqa'a Shia'a Islamic fundamentalism 
Lebanese Communist Party   Secular, National Marxist 
Kataeb Party   Mainly Maronites Mount Lebanon "Kisinvan, Mattn, and Beirut" 
Conservative 
rightwing 
National Liberal Party ---------- Mainly Maronite "Chouf & Beirut" Conservative rightwing 
National Block --------- Mainly Maronite "Jbeil & Beirut" Liberal; Lebanese Nationalism 
Tashnaq Party 3 Deputies Armenians "Mount Lebanon & Beirut" Armenian Nationalist 
Islamic Jama'a 3 Deputies Sunni "Beirut & Sidon" Islamic fundamentalism 
Confession Registered               voters % 
 
Alawite 23 696                           0.8 
Armenian-catholic 20 217          0.7 
Armenian-orthodox 90 675        3 
Druze 169 293                            5.6 
Greek-catholic 156 521              5.2 
Greek-orthodox 236 402            7.9 
Maronite 667 556                       22.19 
Minorities 47 018                       1.56 
Protestant 17 409                        0.58 
Shiite 783 903                            26.06 
Sunni 795 233                            26.44 
Total 3 007 927 100.0




Islamic Philanthropic Projects 
Association (Ahbash) 1 Deputy Sunni "Beirut" Liberal Islamist 
Wa'ad Party 2 Deputies Mainly Maronite "Beirut, Zahleh, Metn" Liberal Ex-Militia 
Hanshaq Party 1 Deputy Armenian "Beirut" Armenian Nationalist 
Popular Nasserite Organization 1 Deputy Sunni "Sidon" Arab Nationalist 
Lebanese Forces ---------- Mainly Maronite "Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North" Militia "Dissolved by the state" 
Democratic Socialist Party ---------- South Lebanon Traditional, sectarian, feudal heritage 
Small local parties 4 Deputies Very narrowly based Limited local representation 
Total: 39.   percentage 39/128 = 30.5% 





Table 5: Political Parties Represented in the Lebanese Parliament 1951-1972  
  1951 1953 1957 1960 1964 1968 1972 
Tashnak Party  2 2 3 4 4 3 2 
Progressive Socialist Party  3 2-4 3 6 6 5 4 
Kataeb Party (Phalange)  3 1 1 6 4 9 7 
National Block  2 3 4 6 2 5 3 
National Liberal Party        4-5 6 8 7 
Social National Syrian Party      1        
Baa'th (pro Iraq)              1 
Nasserite Organization              1 
Najada        1      
Democratic Socialist party             3 
Total 10 8-10 12 27-28 22 30 28 
Adopted from, Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa, Frank Tachau, ed. (Green Wood Press, West 





Table 6: Electoral Participation 1943-1992  











From Al-Intikhabat Al Niabiah 1861-1992: Al-Qwaneen - Al-Nataej. (University Institute for Studies, Beirut 1992).  










Table 7: Economic activity rates by governorate  
Beirut 56.4 
Mount Lebanon 50.6 
North Lebanon 41.9 
Bekaa 40.2 
South Lebanon 42.3 
Nabatieh 44.5 
Lebanon 47.1 
Based on Source: Central Administration for Statistics, www.cas.gov.lb 
 
 
    Map 1:  Greater and Smaller Lebanon                             Map 2: Geography and Communities  
 
Map 1 and 2 is adapted from Itamar Rabinovich (1985) The War for Lebanon, 1970  1985, Ithaca, N. Y: Cornell 
University Press, page 23.  
